 |
An
Argument Shewing, that a Standing Army is inconsistent with a
Free Government, and absolutely destructive to the Constitution
of the English Monarchy
|
BY
JOHN TRENCHARD
with
WALTER MOYLE
LONDON;
Printed in the Year 1697.
John Trenchard (1662-1723), English writer and Commonwealth man, belonged to the same Dorset family as the Secretary of State Sir John Trenchard.
Trenchard was educated at Trinity College, Dublin. As he inherited considerable wealth, Trenchard was able to devote the greater part of his life to writing on political subjects, his approach being that of a Whig and an opponent of the High Church party. His works include A Short History of Standing Armies in England 1698 and 1731 and The Natural History of Superstition 1709. Along with Thomas Gordon he published The Independent Whig, a weekly periodical. From 1720 to 1723, Trenchard, again with Thomas Gordon, wrote a series of 144 essays entitled Cato's Letters, condemning corruption and lack of morality within the British political system and warning against tyranny. The essays were published as Essays on Liberty, Civil and Religious, first in the London Journal and then in the British Journal. These essays became a cornerstone of the Commonwealth men tradition. From 1722 until his death in 1723 Trenchard was also a member of Parliament from Taunton.
When I consider what
a dismal scene of blood and desolation hath appeared upon the theatre
of Europe during the growth and progress of the French power, I cannot
sufficiently applaud and admire our thrice happy situation, by which we
have long enjoyed an uninterrupted course of peace and prosperity, whilst
our neighboring nations have been miserably harassed by perpetual war:
For lying open to continual invasion, they can never enjoy quiet and security,
nor take a sound sleep, but, Hercules like, with clubs in their hands:
So that these halcyon days which we enjoy amidst such an universal hurricane,
must be solely attributed to our tutelar god Neptune, who with a guard
of winged coursers so strongly intrenches us, that we may be said to be
media insuperabiles unda, and not unfitly compared to the earth,
which stands fixed and immoveable, and never to be shaken but by an internal
convulsion. And as nature has been thus liberal to us in our situation,
so the luxuriancy of our soil makes it productive of numerous commodities
fit for trade and commerce: And as this trade renders us masters of the
silver and gold of the east and west without our toiling in the mine,
so it breeds us multitudes of able-bodied and skillful seamen to defend
the treasures they bring home, that even luxury itself which has been
the bane and destruction of most countries where it has been predominant,
may in some measure be esteemed our preservation, by breeding up a race
of men among us, whose manner of life will never suffer them to be debauched,
or enervated with ease or idleness. But we have one thing more to boast
of besides all these felicities, and that is, of being freemen and not
slaves in this unhappy age, when an universal deluge of tyranny has overspread
the face of the whole earth; so that this is the ark out of which if the
dove be sent forth, she will find no resting place till her return.
Our Constitution is a limited mixed monarchy, where the king enjoys all
the prerogatives necessary to the support of his dignity, and protection
of his people, and is only abridged from the power of injuring his own
subjects: In short, the man is loose, and the beast only bound; and our
government may truly be called an empire of laws, and not of men for every
man has the same right to what he can acquire by his labor and industry,
as the king hath to his crown, and the meanest subject hath his remedy
against him in his courts at Westminster: No Man can be imprisoned, unless
he has transgressed a law of his own making, nor be tried but by his own
neighbors; so that we enjoy a liberty scarce known to the ancient Greeks,
and Romans.
And less the extraordinary
power intrusted in the crown should lean towards arbitrary government,
or the tumultuary licentiousness of the people should incline towards
a democracy, the wisdom of our ancestors hath instituted a middle state,
viz. of nobility whose interest is to trim this boat of our Commonwealth,
and to screen the people against the insults of the prince, and the prince
against the popularity of the Commons, since if either extreme prevail
so far as to oppress the other, they are sure to he overwhelmed in their
ruin. And the meeting of these three states in Parliament is what we call
our government: for without all their consents no law can be made, nor
a penny of money levied upon the subjects; so that the king's necessities
do often oblige him to summon this court, which is the grand inquest of
the kingdom, where the people speak boldly their grievances, and call
to account overgrown criminals, who are above the reach of ordinary justice:
so that the excellence of this government consists in the due balance
of the several constituent parts of it, for if either one of them should
be too hard for the other two, there is an actual dissolution of the Constitution;
but whilst we can continue in our present condition, we may without vanity
reckon ourselves the happiest people in the world.
But as there is no degree of human happiness but is accompanied with some
defects, and the strongest constitutions are most liable to certain diseases;
so the very excellence of our government betrays it to some inconvenience,
the wheels and motions of it being so curious and delicate that it is
often out of order, and therefore we ought to apply our utmost endeavors
to rectify and preserve it: and I am afraid it is more owing to the accident
of our situation, than to our own wisdom, integrity or courage, that it
has yet a being; when we see most nations in Europe overrun with oppression
and slavery, where the lives, estates and liberties of the people are
subject to the lawless fancy and ambition of the prince, and the rapine
and indolence of his officers; where the nobility, that were formerly
the bold assertors of their countries liberty, and now only the ensigns
and ornaments of the tyranny, and the people beasts of burden, and barely
kept alive to support the luxury and prodigality of their masters.
And if we enquire how these unhappy nations have lost that precious jewel
liberty, and we as yet preserved it, we shall find their miseries
and our happiness proceed from this, that their necessities or indiscretion
have permitted a standing army to be kept amongst them, and our situation
rather than our prudence, hath as yet defended us from it, otherwise we
had long since lost what is the most valuable thing under heaven: For,
as I said before, our Constitution depending upon a due balance between
King, Lords and Commons, and that balance depending upon the mutual occasions
and necessities they have of one another; if this cement be once broke,
there is an annual dissolution of the government. Now this balance can
never be preserved but by an union of the natural and artificial strength
of the kingdom, that is, by making the militia to consist of the same
persons as have the property; or otherwise the government is violent and
against nature, and cannot possibly continue, but the Constitution must
either break the army, or the army will destroy the Constitution: for
it is universally true, that wherever the militia is, there is or will
be the government in a short time; and therefore the institutors of this
Gothick balance (which was established in all parts of Europe) made the
militia to consist of the same parts as the government, where the king
was general, the Lords by virtue of their castles and honors, the great
commanders and the freeholders by their tenures the body of the army;
so that it was next to impossible for an army thus constituted to act
to the disadvantage of the Constitution, unless we could suppose them
to be felons de se. And here I will venture to assert that upon no other
foundation than this, can any nation long preserve its freedom, unless
some very particular accidents contribute to it; and I hope I shall make
it appear, that no nation ever preserved its liberty, that maintained
an army otherwise constituted within the seat of their government: and
let us flatter ourselves as much as we please, what happened yesterday,
will come to pass again; and the same causes will produce like effects
in all ages.
And here I can't avoid taking notice of some gentlemen who a few years
since were the pretended patriots of their country, who had nothing in
their mouths but the sacred name of liberty, who in the late reigns could
hardly afford the king the prerogative that was due to him, and which
was absolutely necessary to put in motion this machine of our government,
and to make the springs and wheels of it act naturally, and perform their
function: I say, these gentlemen that could not with patience hear of
the king's ordinary guards, can now discourse familiarly of twenty thousand
men to be maintained in times of peace; and the odious excuse they give
for this infamous apostacy is: That if they should not gratify the court
in this modest request, another party may be caressed who will grant this,
or anything else which is asked, and then they say matters will be much
worse as if arbitrary government was a different thing in their hands,
from what it is in others, or that the lineaments and features of tyranny
would become graceful and lovely when they are its Valet de Chambres.
But let them not deceive themselves, for if they think to make their court
this way, they will quickly find themselves outflattered by the party
they fear, who have been long the darlings of arbitrary power, and whose
principles as well as practices teach them to be enemies to all the legal
rights, and just liberties of their native country; and so these wretched
bunglers will be made use of only to bring together the materials of tyranny,
and then must give place to more expert architects to finish the building.
And tho we are secure from any attempts of this kind during the reign
of a prince who hath reduced us from a captivity equal to what Moses redeemed
the people of Israel from; A prince whose life is so necessary to the
preservation of Europe, that both Protestant and Popish princes have forgot
their ancient maxims, and laid aside their innate animosities, and made
it their common interest to choose him their patron and protector: A prince
in whom we know no vices but what have been esteemed virtues in others,
viz., his undeserved clemency to his enemies, and his exposing too much
that life upon which depends not only our safety, but the liberties of
all Europe, and the Protestant religion through the world: I say, was
this most excellent prince to be immortal (as his great and glorious actions)
we ought in common prudence to abandon all thoughts of self-preservation,
and wholly to rely on his care and conduct. But since no virtue nor pitch
of glory will exempt him from paying the common debt to nature, but death
hath a sythe which cuts off the most noble lives; we ought not to intrust
any power with him, which we don't think proper to be continued to his
successors: and doubtless our great benefactor will not regret this, or
anything else that can reasonably be demanded in order to complete that
deliverance so far advanced by his invincible courage and conduct for
to let us, like Moses, within view of the promised Land, with a ne
plus ultra, is the greatest of all human infelicities, and such that
always take our case to be, whilst a standing army must be kept up to
prey upon our entrails, and which must in the hands of an ill prince (which
we have the misfortune frequently to meet with) infallibly destroy our
Constitution. And this is so evident and important a truth, that no legislator
ever founded a free government, but avoided this Caribdis, as
a rock against which his Commonwealth must certainly be shipwrecked, as
the Israelites, Athenians, Corinthians, Archaians, Lacedemonians, Thebans,
Samnites, and Romans; none of which nations whilst they kept their liberty
were ever known to maintain any soldiers in constant pay within their
cities, or ever suffered any of their subject to make war their profession
well knowing that the sword and sovereignty will march hand in hand, and
therefore they trained their own citizens and the territories about them
perpetually in arms, and their whole Commonwealths by this means became
so many several formed militias: A general exercise of the best of their
people in the use of arms, was the only bulwark of their liberties; this
was reckoned the surest way to preserve them both at home and abroad,
the people being secured thereby as well against the domestic affronts
of any of their own citizens, as against the foreign invasions of ambitious
and unruly neighbors. Their arms were never lodged in the hands of any
who had not an Interest in preserving the public peace, who sought pro
aris & focis, and thought themselves, sufficiently paid by repelling
invaders, that they might with freedom return to their own affairs. In
those days there was no difference between the citizen, the soldier, and
the husbandman, for all promiscuously took arms when the publick safety
required it, and afterwards laid them down with more alacrity than they
took them up: So that we find amongst the Romans the best and bravest
of their generals came from the plough, contentedly returning when the
work was over, and never demanded their triumphs till they had laid down
their commands, and reduced themselves to the state of private men. Nor
do we find that this famous Commonwealth ever permitted a deposition of
their arms in any other hands, till their Empire increasing, necessity
constrained them to erect a constant stipendiary soldiery abroad in foreign
parts, either for the holding or winning of provinces: Then luxury increasing
with dominion, the strict rule and discipline of freedom soon abated,
and forces were kept up at home, which soon proved of such dangerous consequence,
that the people were forced to make a law to employ them at a convenient
distance; which was, that if any general marched over the river Rubicon,
he should be declared a publick enemy : and in the passage of that river
this following inscription was erected Imperator sive miles, sive
Tyannus armatus quisquis sistito, vexillumq; armaq; deponiso, nec citra
hunc amnem trajicito: and this made Cesar when he had presumed to
pass this river, to think of nothing but pressing on to the total oppression
of the Empire, which he shortly after obtained.
Nor, as I said before, did any nation deviate from these rules but they
lost their liberty and of this kind there are infinite examples, out of
which I shall give a few in several ages, which are most known, and occur
to every ones reading.
The first example I shall give is of Pisitratus, who artificially prevailing with the Athenians to allow him fifty guards for the defense of his person, he so improved that number, that he seized upon the castle and government, destroyed the Commonwealth, and made himself tyrant of Athens.
The Corinthians being in apprehension of their enemies, made a decree for four hundred men to be kept to defend their city, and gave Tymophanes the command over them, who overturned their government, cut off all the principal citizens, and proclaimed himself king of Corinth.
Agathocles being the captain general of the Syracusians, got such an interest in the army, that he cut all the senators to pieces, and the richest of the people, and made himself their king.
The Romans for fear
of the Teutones and Cimbri, who like vast inundations threatened
their Empire, chose Marius, their general, and, contrary to the
constitution of their government, continues him, five years in his command,
which gave him such opportunity to insinuate, and gain an interest in
their army, that he oppressed their liberty: and to this were owing all
the miseries, massacres, and ruins which that city suffered under him
and Sylla, who made the best blood in the world run like water
in the streets of Rome, and turned the whole city into a shambles of the
nobility, gentry and people.
The same thing enabled Cesar totally to overthrow that famous
commonwealth for the prolongation of his commission in Gaul gave him an
opportunity to debauch his army, and then upon a pretended disgust he
marched to drive out the senators, seized the treasury, fought their forces,
and made himself perpetual dictator.
Olivarotto di Fermo desired leave of his fellow citizens, that he might be admitted into their town with a hundred horse of his companions which being granted, he put to the sword all the principal citizens, and proclaimed himself their prince.
Francis Sforza being general of the Milanese, usurped upon them, and made himself Duke of Milan.
After Christiern the second king of Denmark had conquered Sweden, he invited all the senators and nobility to a magnificent entertainment, where after he had treated them highly for two days, he most barbarously butchered them. None escaped this massacre but the brave Gustavus Ericson, who was then a prisoner; but he afterwards escaping through a thousand difficulties, by his good fortune, courage and conduct, drove the Danes out of Sweden, and restored the Swedes to their ancient kingdom. Nothing then was thought too great for their generous deliverer, every mouth was full of his praises, and by the universal voice of the people he was chosen their king; and to consummate the last testimony of their gratitude, they trusted him with an army: but they soon found their mistake, for it cost them their liberty and having granted that unum magnum, it was too late to dispute anything else: His successors having been pleased to take all the rest, and now they remain the miserable examples of too credulous generosity.
The story of Denmark is so generally known, and so well related by a late excellent author, that it would he impertinence in me to repeat it; only this I will observe, that if the king had not had an army at his command, the nobles had never delivered up their government.
Our countryman Oliver Cromwell turned out that Parliament under which he served, and who had got immortal honor through the whole world by their great actions; and this he effected by the assistance of an army, which must be allowed to have had as much virtue, sobriety, and publick spirit, as hath been known in the world since amongst that sort of men.
The last instance I shall give, is of a French colony, as I remember in the West-Indies, who having war with the neighboring Indians, and being tired in their march with the extremity of heat, made their slaves carry their arms, who taking that opportunity fell upon them, and cut them to pieces: a just punishment for their folly. And this will always be the fate of those that trust their arms out of their own hands: for it is a ridiculous imagination to conceive men will be servants, when they can be masters. And as Mr. Harrington judiciously observes, Whatever nation suffers their servants to carry their arms, their servants will make them hold their trenchers.
Some people object,
that the Republics of Venice and Holland are instances to disprove my
assertion, who both keep great armies, and yet have not lost their liberty.
I answer, that neither keep any standing forces within the Seats of their
government, that is, within the City of Venice, Venice, or the great towns
of the United Provinces; but they defend these by their own burghers,
and quarter their mercenaries in their conquered countries, viz. the Venetians
in Greece, and the Continent of Italy, and the Dutch in Brabant and Flanders;
and the situation of these states makes their armies, so posted, not dangerous
to them; for the Venetians cannot be attacked without a fleet, nor the
Dutch be conquered by their own forces, their country being so full of
strong towns, fortified both by art and nature, and defended by their
own citizens, that it would be a fruitless attempt for their own armies
to invade them; for if they should march against any of their cities,
'tis but shutting up their gates, and the design is spoiled.
But if we admit that an army might be consistent with freedom in a commonwealth,
yet it is otherwise in a free monarchy; for in the former 'tis wholly
in the disposal of the people, who nominate, appoint, discard, and punish
the generals and officers as they think fit, and 'tis certain death to
make any attempt upon their liberties; whereas in the latter, the King
is perpetual general, may model the army as he pleases, and it will be
called high-treason to oppose him.
And tho some princes, as the family of the Medices, Lewis the XI, and others laid the foundation of their tyrannies without the immediate assistance of an army, yet they all found an army necessary to establish them; or otherwise a little experience in the people of the change of their condition, would have made them disgorge in a day that ill-gotten power they had been acquiring for an Age.
This subject is so
self-evident, that I am almost ashamed to prove it: for if we look through
the world, we shall find in no country, liberty and an army stand together;
so that to know whether a people are free or slaves, it is necessary only
to ask, whether there is an army kept amongst them? and the solution of
that preliminary question resolves the doubt: as we see in China, India,
Tartary, Persia, Ethiopia, Turkey, Morocco, Moscovy, Austria, France,
Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, Tuscany, and all the little Principalities
of Germany and Italy, where the people live in the most abandoned slavery
and in countries where no armies are kept within the seat of their government,
the people are free, as Poland, Biscay, Switzerland, the Grisons, Venice,
Holland, Genoa, Ragusa, Algeria, Tunis, Hamborg, Lubeck, all the free
towns in Germany, and England and Scotland before the late Reigns. This
Truth is so obvious, that the most barefaced advocates for an army do
not directly deny it, but qualify the matter by telling us, that a number
not exceeding fifteen or twenty thousand men are a handful to so populous
a nation as this: Now I think that Number will bring as certain ruin upon
us, as if they were as many millions, and I will give my reasons for it.
It's the misfortune of all countries, that they sometimes lie under an
unhappy necessity to defend themselves by arms against the ambition of
their governors, and to fight for what is their own; for if a prince will
rule us with a rod of iron, and invade our laws and liberties, and neither
be prevailed upon by our miseries, supplications, or tears, we have no
power upon earth to appeal to, and therefore must patiently submit to
our bondage, or stand upon our own defense; which if we are enabled to
do, we shall never be put upon it, but our swords may grow truly in our
hands: for that nation is surest to live in peace, that is most capable
of making war; and a man that hath a sword by his side, shall have least
occasion to make use of it. Now I say, if the king hath twenty thousand
men beforehand with us, or much less than half that number, the people
can make no effort to defend their liberties, without the assistance of
a foreign power, which is a remedy most commonly as bad as the disease
and if we have not a power within ourselves to defend our laws, we are
no government.
For England being a small country, few strong towns in it, and those in the king's hands, the nobility disarmed by the destruction of tenures, and the militia not to be raised but by the king's command, there can be no force levied in any part of England, but must be destroyed in its infancy by a few regiments: For what will three or four thousand naked and unarmed men signify against as many troops of mercenary soldiers? What if they should come into the field, and say you must choose these and these men your representatives; where is your choice? What if they should say, Parliaments are seditious and factious assemblies, and therefore ought to be abolished; What is become of our freedom? Or if they should encompass the Parliament-House, and threaten if they do not surrender up their government, they will put them to the sword; What is become of the old English Constitution? These things may be, and have been done in several parts of the world. What is it that causeth the tyranny of the Turks at this day, but servants in arms? What is it that preserved the glorious Commonwealth of Rome, but swords in the hands of its citizens?
And if besides this, we consider the great prerogatives of the crown, and the vast interest the king has and may acquire by the distribution of so many profitable offices of the household, of the revenue, of state, of law, of religion, and the navy, together with the assistance of a powerful party, who have been always the fast and consist friends to arbitrary power whose only quarrel to his present majesty, was that he has knocked off the chains and fetters they thought they had locked fast upon us; a party, who hath once engaged us in a unhappy quarrel amongst ourselves (the consequences which I dread to name) and since in a tedious and chargeable war, at the vast expense of blood and treasure, to avoid that captivity they had prepared for us: I say, if any one considers this, he will be convinced that we have enough to do to guard ourselves against the power of the court, without having an army thrown into the scale against us: and we have found oftner than once by too fatal experience the truth of this; for if we look back to the late reigns, we shall see this nation brought to the brink of destruction, and breathing out the last gasp of their liberty; and it is more owing to our good fortune, than to any effort we were able to make, that we escaped the fatal blow.
And I believe no man will deny, but if Charles the First had had five thousand men beforehand with us, the people had never struck a stroke for their Liberties; or if the late King James would have been contented with arbitrary power without bringing in Popery, but he and his black guard would have bound his hand and foot before this time: But when their ill-contrived oppression came home to their own doors, they quickly showed the world how different a thing it was to flatter themselves, and to make other people suffer, and so we came by our deliverance; and tho the late king had the nobility, gentry, clergy, people, and his own army against him, and we had a very wise and courageous prince nearly related to the crown, and backed by a powerful state, for our protector, yet we account this revolution next to a miracle.
I will add here, that
most of the nations I instanced before were enslaved by small armies:
Oliver Cromwell left behind him but 17,000 men; and the Duke of Monmouth,
who was the darling of the people, was suppressed with two thousand; nay,
Cesar seized Rome itself with five thousand, and fought the Battle of
Pharsalia, where the fate of the world was decided, with twenty two thousand;
and most of the revolutions of the Roman and Ottoman Empires since were
caused by the Pretorian Bands, and the Court-Janizaries; the former of
which never exceeded eight, nor the latter twelve thousand men: And if
no greater numbers could make such disturbances in those vast empires,
what will double the force do with us? And they themselves confess it,
when they argue for an army; for they tell us we may be surprised with
ten or fifteen thousand men from France, and having no regular force to
oppose them, they will overrun the kingdom. Now if so small a force can
oppose the king, the militia, with the united power of the nobility, gentry
and commons, what will an equal power do against the people, when supported
by the royal authority, and a never-failing interest that will attend
it, except when it acts for the publick good?
But we are told this army is not designed to be made a part of our Constitution,
but to be kept only for a little time, till the circumstances of Europe
will better permit us to be without them. But I would know of these gentlemen,
when they think that time will be? Will it be during the life of King
James, or after his death? Shall we have less to fear from the youth and
vigor of the pretended Prince of Wales, than now from an unhappy man sinking
under the load of age and misfortunes? Or will France be more capable
of offending us just after this tedious and consumptive war, than hereafter
when it has had a breathing time to repair the calamities it has suffered
by it? No: we can never disband our army with so much safety as at this
time; and this is well known by these conspirators against their country,
who are satisfied that a continuation of them now, is an establishment
of them forever: for whilst the circumstances of Europe stand in the present
posture, the argument will be equal to continue them; if the state of
Europe should alter to the advantage of France, the reason will grow stronger,
and we shall be told we must increase our number: but if there should
be such a turn of affairs in the world, that we were no longer in apprehension
of the French power, they may be kept up without our assistance; nay,
the very discontents they may create shall be made an argument for the
continuing of them. But, if they should be kept from oppressing the people,
in a little time they will grow habitual to us, and almost become a part
of our Constitution, and by degrees we shall be brought to believe them
not only not dangerous, but necessary; for everybody sees, but few understand,
and those few will never be able to persuade the multitude that there
is any danger in those men they have lived quietly with for some years,
especially when the disbanding them will (as they will be made believe)
cost them more money out of their own pockets to maintain a militia, and
of this we have had already an unhappy experience. For Charles the Second
being connived at in keeping a few guards (which were the first ever known
to an English King besides his Pensioners, and his Beef-eaters) he sensibly
increased their number, till he left a body of men to his successor great
enough to tell the Parliament, he would be no longer bound by the laws
he had sworn to; and under the shelter and protection of these he raised
an army; that had put a period to our government, if a complication of
causes (which may never happen again) had not presented the Prince of
Orange with a conjuncture to assert his own and the nation's rights. And
tho we have so lately escaped this precipice, yet habit has made soldiers
so familiar to us, that some will pretend to be zealous for liberty, speak
of it as a hardship to his present majesty, to refuse him as many men
as his predecessors, not considering that the raising them then was a
violation of our laws, and that his government is built upon the destruction
of theirs, and can no more stand upon the same rubbish, than the kingdom
of heaven be founded in unrighteousness.
But the conspirators say, we need be in no apprehensions of slavery whilst
we keep the power of the purse in our own hands: which is very true; but
they do not tell us that he has the power of raising money, to whom no
one dares refuse it.
Arma
tenenti
Omnia dat quie justa negat.
For 'tis as certain that an army will raise money, as that money will
raise an army; but if this course be too desperate, 'tis but shutting
up the Exchequer, and disobliging a few tally-jobbers (who have bought
them for fifty per cent discount) and there will be near three millions
a year ready cut and dried for them: and whoever doubts whether such a
method as this is practicable, let him look back to the reign of Charles
the Second. And I am afraid the officers of the exchequer have not much
reason to value themselves for their payments in this reign; at least
the purchasers of the annuities are of that opinion and would be apt to
entertain some unreasonable suspicions, if they had not greater security
from his majesty's virtue than the justice of such ministers. But if we
could suppose (whatever is the fate of other countries) that our courtiers
design nothing but the publick good, yet we ought not to hazard such unusual
virtue, by leading it into temptation, which is part of our daily duty
to pray against. But I am afraid we don't live in an age of miracles,
especially of that sort; our heroes are made of a coarser alloy, and have
too much dross mixed with their constitutions for such refined principles:
for in the little experience I have had in the world, I have observed
most men to do as much mischief as lay in their power, and therefore am
for dealing with them as we do with children and mad men, that is, take
away all weapons by which they may do either themselves or others an injury:
As I think the sheep in Boccaline made a prudent address to Apollo, when
they desired, that for the future wolves might have no teeth.
When all other arguments fail, they call to their Assistance the old tyrant
necessity, and tell us the power of France is so great, that let the consequence
of an army be what it will, we cannot be without one; and if we must be
slaves, we had better be so to a Protestant prince than a king. Now I
am of Mr. Johnson's opinion, that the putting an epithet upon tyranny
is a false heraldry; for Protestant and Popish are both alike; and if
I must be a Slave, it is very indifferent to me who is my master, and
therefore I shall never consent to be ruled by an army, which is the worst
that the most barbarous conquest can impose upon me; which notwithstanding
we have little reason to fear whilst we keep the seas well guarded.
It is
certain there is no country so situated for naval power as England. The
sea is our element, our seamen have as much hardy bravery, and our ships
are as numerous, and built of as good materials as any in the world: Such
a force well applied and managed is able to give laws to the universe;
and if we keep a competent part of it well armed in times of peace, it
is the most ridiculous thing in nature to believe any prince will have
thoughts of invading us, unless he proposes to be superior to us in naval
power: For the preparations necessary for such an undertaking will alarm
all Europe, give both to us and our confederates time to arm, and put
ourselves in a posture of defense. And whoever considers that the Prince
of Orange with six hundred ships brought but fourteen thousand Men, and
the mighty Spanish Armada (then the terror of the world) embarked but
eighteen thousand, he will be assured that no invasion can be so sudden
upon us, but we shall have time to get ready our whole fleet, bring some
forces from Scotland and Ireland, and prepared our own militia if there
shall be occasion for it; especially in times of peace, when we shall
have the liberty of all ports of France, and shall or may have intelligence
from every one of them.
But they tell us such a wind may happen as may be favorable to our enemy,
and keep us within our own ports; which I say, as France lies to England,
is almost impossible: for if we lie about Falmouth, or the Land's end,
no fleet from Brest or the ocean can escape us without a miracle; and
if the designed be to invade us from any ports in the Channel, a very
few ships (which may safely lie at anchor) will certainly prevent it:
nor is it to be conceived that that cautious prince will be a vast expense
for the contingency of such a critical wind, or will send an army into
a country where their retreat is certainly cut off, when the failing in
any part of his design will bring a new war upon him, which lately cost
a third part of his people, a great many large countries and strong towns,
with all the honor he had heaped up by his former victories, to get rid
of.
And here I must confess,
that the misapplication of our naval force (which is our known strength)
for these last eight years, is the strongest, as it is the most usual
argument against me: which unriddles a mystery I did not understand before,
tho I never was so foolish as to believe all the errors of that kind were
the effects of chance or ignorance, or that losing so many opportunities
of destroying the French fleet had not some extraordinary, the occult
cause; and yet, notwithstanding the restless attempt of our enemies, and
the paltry politicks of our own wretched St— n, this fleet triumphantly
defended us, so that our enemies in eight years war could not get one
opportunity of invading our country.
It's objected, that the officers of our fleet may be corrupted, or that
a storm may arise which may destroy it all at once, and therefore we ought
to have two strings to our bow. By which I perceive all their fears lie
one way, and that they do not care if they precipitate us into inevitable
ruin at home, to prevent a distant possibility of it from France. But
I think this phantom too may be laid by a well-trained militia, and then
all their bugbears will vanish. This word can be no sooner out, but there
is a volly of small shot let fly at me: What! must we trust our safety
to an undisciplined mob, who never dreamed of fighting when they undertook
the service; who are not inured to the fatigue of a camp, or ever saw
the face of an enemy? And then they magnify mercenary troops, as if there
was an intrinsic virtue in a red coat, or that a raggamuffin from robbing
of henroosts, in two campaigns could be cudgeled into a hero. Tho I must
confess the conduct of the court in industriously enervating this force,
does in some measure justify their objections; For the detestable policies
of the last reigns were with the utmost art and application to disarm
the people, and make the militia useless, to countenance a standing army
in order to bring in popery and slavery; and if any methods were proposed
to make it more serviceable, the court would never suffer them to be debated;
and such officers as were more zealous in exercising their companies than
others, were reprimanded, as if they designed to raise a Rebellion. And
now the worthy patriots of this reign are taking advantage of the traitorous
neglect and infamous policies of the last. But why may not a militia be
made useful? Why may not the nobility, gentry, and free-holders of England
be trusted with the defense of their own lives, estates and liberties,
without having guardians and keepers assigned them? And why may they not
defend them with as much vigor and courage as mercenaries who have nothing
to lose, nor any other tie to engage their fidelity, than the inconsiderable
pay of six-pence a day, which they may have from the conqueror?
Why may not the Laws for shooting in crossbows be changed into firelocks,
and a competent number of them be kept in every parish for the young men
to exercise with on holidays, and rewards offered to the most expert,
to stir up their emulation?
Why may not the whole militia of England be reduced to fifty thousand, and a third part of those kept by turns in constant exercise?
Why may not a man be listed in the militia till he be discharged by his master, as well as in the army till he be discharged by his captain? And why may not the same horse he always sent forth, unless it can be made appear he is dead or maimed ?
Why may not the private soldiers of the army, when they are dispersed in the several parts of the kingdom, be sent to the militia? And why may not the inferior officers the army in some proportion command them?
I say, these and other
like things may be done, and some of them are done in our own plantations,
and the Islands of Jersey and Guernsey, as also in Poland, Switzerland,
and the country of the Grisons which are nations much less considerable
than England, have as formidable neighbors, no sea nor fleet to defend
them, nothing but a militia to defend upon, and yet no one dares attack
them: And we have seen as great performances done formerly by the apprentices
of London, and in the late war by the Vandois in Savoy, the Miquelets
in Catalonia, and the militia in Ireland, as can be paralleled in history:
And so it would be with us, if the court would give their hearty assistance
in promoting this design; if the king would appear in person at the head
of them, and give rewards and honor to such as deserve them, we should
quickly see the young nobility and gentry appear magnificent in arms and
equipage, show a generous emulation in outvying one another in military
exercises, and place a noble ambition in making themselves serviceable
to their country as anciently the Achaians and Thebans from being the
most contemptible Nations in Greece, by the Conduct of Pelopidas, Eparminondas,
and Philopemen, came to have the disciplined troops and most excellent
soldiers in the world.
They object, that such a militia as this is a standing army, and will
be as dangerous, and much more chargeable. I answer;
That there can be
no danger from an army where the nobility and chief gentry of England
are the commanders, and the body of it made up of the freeholders, their
sons and servants; unless we can conceive that the nobility and gentry
will join in an unnatural design to make void their own titles to their
estates and liberties: and if they could entertain so ridiculous a proposition,
they would never by obeyed by the soldiers, who will have a respect to
those that send them forth and pay them, and to whom they must return
again when their time is expired. For if I send a man, I will as surely
choose one which shall fight for me, as a mercenary officer will choose
one that shall fight against me; and the late governments are witnesses
to the truth of this, who debauched the militia more than ever I hope
to see it again, and yet durst never rely upon them to assist their arbitrary
designs; as we may remember in the Duke of Monmonth's invasion, their
officers durst not bring them near his army for fear of a revolt. Nay,
the Pensioner-Parliament themselves turned short upon the Court, when
they expected them to give the finishing stroke to our Ruin.
To the last part of the objection, That this militia will be more chargeable
than an army; I answer, That since (as I suppose) no man proposes wholly
to lay them aside; if we add the extraordinary experience of maintaining
twenty thousand men to the ordinary charge of the militia, it is much
more than sufficient to make the latter useful. But if this objection
were true, it ought not to enter into competition with the preservation
of our laws and liberties; for it is better to give a third part of my
estate, if it were necessary, than to have all taken from me.
And tho it should be granted, that a militia is not as serviceable as an army kept to constant discipline, yet I believe these gentlemen themselves will confess, that sixty thousand of them trained as before, are as good as twenty thousand of their standing troops, which is the question; for its impossible to have them both useful at the same time, they being as incompatible as broad and clipt money, never current together; and therefore the Court must depend wholly upon a militia, or else they will not depend upon them at all. And this by the way may silence that objection, that we must keep our army till the militia be disciplined; for that will never be done whilst the Court has an army: and the same objection will be made seven years hence as now; so that a small army can be of no use to us, but to make our fleet neglected, to hinder the militia from being trained, and enslave us at home; for they are too few to defend us against an Invasion, and too many for the people to oppose.
I dare speak with
the greater assurance upon this subject, having the authority of as great
men as the world hath produced for my justification. Machiavelli spends
several chapters to prove, that no prince or state ought to suffer any
of their subjects to make war their profession, and that no nation can
be secure with any other forces than a settled militia. My Lord Bacon
in several places bears his testimony against a standing army, and particularly
he tells us, that a mercenary army is first to invade a country, but a
militia to defend it; because the first have estates to get, and the latter
to protect. Mr. Harrington hath founded his whole Oceana upon
a trained militia; and I have lately read a French book, called a History
of the Politicks of France, which says, Enfin si on veut ruiner
Les Anglois il suffit de les obliger a tener des Troupes sur pied
Nay, I believe no Author ever treated of a free government, that did not
express his abhorrence of an army; for (as my Lord Bacon says) whoever
does use them, tho he may spread his feathers for a time, he will mew
them soon after; and raise them with what design you please, yet, like
the West India dogs in Boccaline, in a little time they will certainly
turn sheep-biters.
Perhaps it will be said, that the artillery of the world is changed since
some of these wrote, and war is; become more a mystery, and therefore
more experience is necessary to make good soldiers. But wherein does this
mystery consist? not in exercising a company, and obeying a few words
of command; these are mercenaries that the dullest noddle will comprehend
in a few weeks. Nay, I have heard that the modern exercise is much shorter
and easier than the ancient. But the great Improvements in war are in
regular encampments, fortification, gunnery, skillful engineering, &c.
These are arts not to be learned without much labor, and experience, and
are as much gained in the closet as in the field; and I suppose no man
will say, that the keeping standing forces is necessary to make a good
engineer.
As to actual experience in war, that is not essential either to a standing
army or a militia, as such; but the former may be without it, and the
latter gain it according as they have opportunities of action. "Tis
true at present the army hath been trained up in a long war, and hath
gained great Knowledge: but these men will not be long when they are disbanded,
they will be still in England; and if the Parliament does give them a
gratuity suitable to the service they have done their country, they will
be ready to resume their arms whenever occasion offers.
But I desire to know of these patriots how comes an army necessary to our preservation now, and never since the conquest before? Did ever the prevailing party in the wars of York and Lancaster attempt to keep up a standing army to support themselves? No: they had more sense than to sacrifice their own liberty, and more honor than to enslave their country, the more easily to carry on their own liberty. Were not the Spaniards as powerful, as good soldiers, and as much our enemies, as the French are now? Was not Flanders as near us as France? and the Popish interest in Queen Elizabeth's time as strong as the Jacobite is now? and yet that most excellent Princess never dreamed of a standing Army, but thought her surest empire was to reign in the hearts of her subjects, which the following story sufficiently testifies. When the Duke of Alanson came over to England, and for some time had admired the riches of the city, the conduct of her government, and the magnificence of her Court, he asked her amidst so much splendor where were her guards? which question she resolved a few days after as she took him in her coach through the city, when pointing to the people (who received her in crowds with repeated acclamations) These, said she, my Lord, are my guards; These have their hands, their hearts, and their purses always ready at my command: and these were guards indeed, who defended her through a long and successful reign of forty four years against all the machinations of Rome, the power of Spain, a disputed title, and the perpetual conspiracies of her own Popish subjects; a security the Roman Emperors could not boast of with their Pretorian Bands, and their Eastern and Western Armies.
Were not the French
as powerful in Charles the Second and King James his time, as they are
after this long and destructive war, and a less alliance to oppose them?
Any yet we then thought a much less army than is now contended for, a
most insupportable grievance; insomuch that in Charles the Second's Reign
the grand-jury presented them, and the Pensioners Parliament voted them
to be nuisance, sent Sir Jos. W— son to the Tower for saying, the
King might keep guards for the defense of his person, and addressed to
have them, disbanded. And now our apostates would make their Court by
doing what the worst Parliament ever England saw could not think of without
horror and confusion. They say the king of France was in league with our
late kings, so he is with us; and he would have broke it then, if he had
thought it safe, and for his interest as much as now. But they say we
have more disaffected persons to join with him; which I must deny, for
I believe no king of England in any ages had deservedly more interest
than the present; and if during such an expensive war, in which we have
consumed so much blood and treasure, paid such vast and unequal taxes,
lost so many thousand ships and bore a shock by recoining our money, which
would have torn up another nation from its foundation, and reduced it
to its ancient chaos, when most countries would have sunk under the misfortune,
and repined at their deliverance (as men in sickness commonly quarrel
with their dearest friends) I say, if at that time he had so great and
universal an interest, there can be no doubt but in times of peace, when
the people reap the fruits of that courage and conduct he hath shown in
their defense, he will be the most beloved and glorious prince that every
filled the English throne.
I will make one assertion more, and then conclude this discourse, viz.
That the most likely way of restoring King James, is maintaining a standing
army to keep him out.
For the king's safety
stands upon a rock whilst it depends upon the solid foundation of the
affections of the people, which is never to be shaken till 'tis as evident
as the sun in the firmament, that there is a formed design to overthrow
our laws, and liberties; but if we keep a standing army, all depends upon
the uncertain and capricious humors of the soldiery, which in all ages
have produced more violent and sudden revolutions, than every have been
known in unarmed government: For there is such a chain of Dependence amongst
them, that if two or three of the chief officers should be disobliged,
or have intrigues with Jacobite mistresses; or if the King of France could
once again buy his pensions into the Court or army, or offer a better
market to some that are in already, we shall have another rehearsal revolution,
and the people be only idle spectators of their own ruin. And whosoever
considers the composition of an army, and doubts this, let him look back
to the Roman Empire, where he will find out of twenty six Emperors, sixteen
deposed and murdered by their own armies; nay, half the history of the
world is made up of examples of this kind: but we need not go any farther
than our own country, where we have but twice kept armies in times of
peace, and both times they turned out their own masters. The first under
Cromwell, expelled that Parliament under which they had fought successfully
for many years; afterwards under General Monk they destroyed the government
they before set up, and brought back Charles the Second and he afterwards
disbanded them lest they might have turned him out again. These other
instance is fresh in every one's memory, how King James's army joined
with the Prince of Orange, now our rightful and lawful king. And what
could have been expected otherwise from men of dissolute and debauched
principles, who call themselves soldiers of fortune? who make murder their
profession, and enquire no farther into the justice of the cause, than
how they shall be paid; who must be false rapacious and cruel in their
own defense. For having no other profession or subsistence to depend upon,
they are forced to stir up the ambition of princes, and engage them in
perpetual quarrels, that they may share of the spoils they make. Such
men, like some sort of ravenous fish, fare best in a storm; and therefore
we may reasonably suppose they will be better pleased with the tyrannical
government of the late King, than the mild and gracious administration
of this present majesty, who came over to England to rescue us from oppression,
and he has done it, and triumphs in it in spight of his Enemies.
In this discourse I have purposely omitted speaking of the lesser inconveniences
attending a standing army, (such as frequent quarrels, murders and robberies;
the destruction of all the game in the country; the quartering upon publick,
and sometimes private houses; the influencing elections of Parliament
by an artificial distribution of quarters the rendering so many men useless
to labor, and almost propagation, together with a much greater destruction
of them, by taking them from a laborious way of living to a loose idle
life; and before this, the insolence of the officers, and the debaucheries
that are committed both by them and their soldiers in all the towns they
come in, to the ruin of multitudes of women, dishonor of the families,
and ill example to others; and a numerous train of mischiefs besides,
almost endless to enumerate. These are trivial as well as particular grievances
in respect to those I have treated about, which strike at the heart's-blood
of our Constitution, and therefore I thought these not considerable enough
to bear a part in a discourse of this nature: Besides they often procure
their own remedy, working miracles, and making some men see that were
born blind, and impregnable against all the artillery of reason; for experience
is the only mistress of fools: A wise man will know a pike will bite when
he sees his teeth, which another will not make discovery of but by the
loss of a finger.
What I have said here against standing armies, I would be understood of
such as are the instruments of tyranny and their country's ruin, and therefore
I need make no apology to our own which was raised by the consent of the
Parliament in this just and necessary war, and next under God and our
great and glorious deliverer, have by their bravery and conduct preserved
our liberties, and the Protestant religion through Europe. For if in future
reigns any designs should be leveled against our laws, we may be assured
these men would be discarded, and others promoted in their rooms who are
fit for such arbitrary purposes.
Nor do I think it reasonable that our army should be ruined by that peace, which by their courage and fidelity they have procured for their country; and I doubt not but the generosity and gratitude of the Parliament will give them a donative equal to their commissions, which, when the foreigners are paid and sent home, will amount to no extraordinary sum; at most 'tis but supposing the war to have six months longer continuance, which is an easy composition for the charge of keeping them. But if there are any gentlemen amongst them who think we can no otherwise express our gratitude, but by signing the sealing our own ruin, I hope we shall disappoint their expectations, and not give the world occasion to tell so foolish a story of us, as they we turned to grass one of the most powerful monarchs in the world for breaking our laws, that we have maintained an eight years war at the expense of forty millions of money, and the blood of three hundred thousand men, to justify the glorious actions we have done; that by it we preserved all Europe besides, and lost our own Liberties; at least I hope it shall not be said we consented to it.