The burden of maintaining Spain's growing armed forces in North America weighed heavily on New Spain, the richest of the viceroyalties. Although the public revenues of the kingdom more than doubled in the years 1763–1779, the increase in the subsidies (situados) paid by Mexico City to the colonies financially dependent upon it tripled. Guatemala, Cuba, Louisiana, Santo Domingo, and Puerto Rico were scenes of increased military and naval activity, and since none of these colonies was self-sufficient, the growth of their defense establishments was reflected in heavier disbursements by New Spain. The Spanish government regarded another war between England and Spain as inevitable, and after hostilities between England and her North American colonies began in 1775, Spain, urged on by France, moved slowly toward support of the rebels and to war with England. Limited and covert aid to the Americans began in 1776 through the port of New Orleans, and the port officials of Spanish America were secretly instructed to admit American privateers. Spain's declaration of war against England in 1779 coincided with the death of Antonio Maria Bucareli, Viceroy of New Spain. His successor, Martín de Mayorga, unexpectedly faced the task of meeting the unprecedented demands made upon the viceroyalty for money, gunpowder; and food. The discharge of his responsibility was made more difficult by almost constant quarrels with José de Galvez, Minster of the Indies, and with officials in Cuba. The principal objectives of the Spanish forces in America were to expel the English from the Mississippi River, to conquer Florida, and to destroy the English log-cutting establishments on the Bay of Honduras. After Bernardo de Gálvez, the Governor of Louisiana, had captured the British posts on the Mississippi River and had taken Mobile and Pensacola, plans were made to recover Jamaica and to take the Bahamas. All of these objectives were not realized, for Jamaica was not invaded, and the Spanish operation against the Baymen had only limited and temporary success. All the Spanish operations were financed and supplied from New Spain, as was the expedition of the French admiral de Grasse from the West Indies to Chesapeake Bay in 1781. In this service of supply Havana functioned as the base for Spanish naval power and as a distribution center for money and supplies. During the period of hostilities, the value of New Spain's disbursements to Spain, to other Spanish colonies, and to allies of Spain, was equivalent to one-half of all the revenue collected by the viceregal establishment. Although the viceroyalty was hard-pressed to meet the obligation imposed on it, the transportation of money, food, and supplies from Mexico to Cuba and to other points proved to be as difficult as their collection. Poor communication and a serious shipping shortage impeded the movement of cargoes and caused the loss of perishable material. This dissertation, written largely from unpublished material in the Archivo General de la Nación in Mexico City and the Archivo Histórico, Nacional in Madrid, Spain, traces the nature and extent of New Spain's contribution to the prosecution of the American war. The conclusions reached are that, despite poor communications, the shipping shortage and dissension among officials in Madrid, Havana, Guatemala, and Mexico City, New Spain was virtually the sole support of Spanish arms in America, and that during the war the viceroyalty made a contribution to the mother country and her allies unmatched in the history of colonial Spanish America.
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