On February 10, 1763, the Treaty of Paris ended the war between Great Britain, Portugal, France, and Spain. By its terms Spain lost the island of Minorca and the two Floridas, although she regained Havana and Manila, both of which had been lost to the British in 1762. France had ceded Louisiana to Spain on compensation for the loss of the Floridas,1 but the effect on Spain of her participation in the Seven Years' War could not be measured solely in terms of colonial territory gained or lost. The armed forces of Carlos III in the Indies had suffered a humiliating defeat, all the more humiliating since it had been unexpected. As late as July 22, 1762, the King had written to his confidant in Naples, Bernardo Tanucci, that "the English will have their heads broken in the Indies".2 Yet at the time he wrote Havana was under attack, its naval squadron had been sunk or scuttled in the harbor, and its land defenses had been invested by an English army. Spain's mistake had been to go to war before she was prepared, for her ministers had been deceived by the misrepresentations of her commanders in the Indies. The soldiers of the Havana garrison had been ill-trained and badly equipped, their officers had been incompetent, and corrupt colonial officials had stolen supplies. Warships had been unready for service for the same reasons, and their commanders had even deprived the crews of their proper rations. During the years that the Marquis of Ensenada had been in power (1743-1754), he had constructed a fleet strong enough to alarm British observers, but its strength had been wasted, and the administrative reforms which he had decreed had either been nullified or had never been implemented. The Viceroyalty of New Spain had never been invaded, and the army of 8,500 regulars and militiamen which Viceroy Cruillas had hastily formed had not been tested in battles Although its armies had not seen action, the war had cost the northern viceroyalty 3,390.471 pesos, one million of which had been totally wasted. That sum had been sent to Havana just before the English attack, and had fallen into the hands of the invaders. Since the payment of the first situado to Cuba in 1529, New Spain had increasingly assumed the role of financier for that island. The function of Havana as a port of deposit and transshipment and as a rendezvous point for fleets bound to and from the Indies had necessitated fortifications and garrisons to man them. The shipyard at Havana had built forty-five warships between 1724 and 1761, and a naval squadron was based permanently on the port. All of these activities required subsidies which New Spain had to furnish; and in 1763, the year of defeat, to financial distress of Cuba was acute. Extraordinary efforts had to be made to repair the damages of the siege. The fortifications had been breached at several points, and the English had practically destroyed the shipyard after the surrender. Enemy officers had told Lorenzo de Montalvo, the Comisario de Marina,that they intended to leave the yard in such a state that no vessels could be constructed in it for the next six years. Cuba needed immediate relief for its land and sea forces, which lacked food, clothing, and supplies of every sort. New Spain was called upon to furnish 3,209,362 pesos for the subsistence of the armed forces of the island between July and December, 1763,10 and Julián de Arriaga, Minister of the Indies, urged Viceroy Cruillas to aid in the rehabilitation of the island with all available funds.11 Cruillas responded promptly, but not with enough money to satisfy the Governor of Havana, the Count of Ricla.12 While Cuba was rebuilding, hundreds of Spanish colonists from East and West Florida were arriving in Havana, for the principal settlements of that Province had been surrendered to the English. The fort of San Marcos, the strong point of St. Augustine, had beaten off three English sieges since its completion in 1687; but it had now fallen bloodlessly into enemy hands.13 From Pensacola in West Florida 634 Spaniards sailed for Veracruz on September 3, 1763, carrying with them 108 Yamasee Indians who were Catholic.14 The West Florida refugees, borne in a flotilla of small craft, arrived unannounced at Vera Cruz in early November; and Viceroy Cruillas helped them to settle in New Spain.15 At this point in his career Viceroy Cruillas must have felt that he had discharged his duties as Captain General well. On August 21, 1763, Ricardo Wall, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote him a congratulatory letter which conveyed the thanks of the King and his complete approbation of the Viceroy's service during the late war.16 Less than a month later the Minister of the Indies, Arriaga, added his personal approval, mentioning Cruillas' organization of militia units, his wise selection of officers, and his frequent trips of inspection to army Units and coastal fortifications.17 The Viceroy had no way of knowing that in Madrid a secret committee of imperial defense, composed of Carlos III's principal ministers, had been convened to consider the lessons learned in 1762 and that changes in the colonial defense system were planned. The King feared future English aggression against his American colonies,18 and the Duke of Choiseul, exploiting his fears, advised Carlos to speed the rebuilding of "our navy [sic] and colonies, in order that within a few years we may be able to wipe out our disgrace.19 Cruillas received the first notice of the activities of the defense junta in a letter from Arriaga, dated September 27, 1763, which stated briefly that the King had called a meeting of experts (unnamed) to consider the problems of colonial defense. The Viceroy would be informed of the decisions of that body "when it was convenient.20 Early in 1764 the junta devised a general plan. For the time being warships would be built in Spain, because the thorough destruction of the Havana facilities made definite construction schedules in that port impossible.21 There was, however, one badly needed maritime reform which could be made by using existing vessels: the institution of a regular mail service between the Peninsula and the Indies.22 The King's junta considered the fortifications of the principal ports of America the first line of defense and as a more important deterrent than sea power. When Viceroy Cruillas reported that English warships from Pensacola were intruding in the coastal waters of New Spain and had even carried out a leisurely reconnaissance of the harbor of Veracruz, he recommended that a coast guard be formed to watch English ship movements in the Gulf of Mexico.23 Having received no satisfaction from his first request, Cruillas wrote again to Arriaga and asked that a frigate be maintained in constant readiness at Veracruz to challenge intruders who appeared offshore. In his response to the Viceroy's second letter Arriaga explained why such action was both impractical and unnecessary. The minister argued in a long didactic statement that to maintain a large warship in a state of constant readiness to put to sea was impossible. Small launches were more useful; they could sail from the port and determine the identity of a strange craft. If the approaching vessel proved to be hostile, the launches could warn the fort, whose cannon "were the true impediment to attack. 23 Arriaga's reply reflected the decision of the King's junta to depend primarily upon repaired and strengthened coastal forts, but the junta had also decided that complete reliance upon fixed defenses was dangerous. Colonial armies would have to be created: not the ad hoc militia units which Cruillas had mustered in seventeen sixty-two, but regiments raised and permanently stationed in America.25 The fijo
(fixed) regiments in the colonies would be built around cadres of
veteran European troops, as would the militia regiments. As in the
past, a few Peninsular regiments of regulars would rotate in overseas
service. The new system was first tried in Cuba,. where Mariscal
de Campo Alejandro O'Reilly reorganized the troops and militia of
the island in 1763 and 1764. The results pleased the Governor and
Captain General of the island, who came to have a high regard for
the Cuban militia.26 Meanwhile, New Spain had acquired another dependent: the Province of Louisiana. A royal order of May 21, 1765, named Antonio de Ulloa governor of the new colony and fixed its annual situado at 150,000 pesos.28 The Governor, who arrived in March, 1766, found Louisiana helpless to resist any thrust from British West Florida. With less than 100 Spanish soldiers at his command, Ulloa was unable to do more than to disperse token garrisons to several posts along the Mississippi River.29 Viceroy Cruillas'
situation became more difficult with the arrival in July, 1765,
of Jose de Gálvez, who came bearing the titles of Visitador
General and Intendente del Ejercito. There was no legal precedent
for such a title, for the intendant system had not been established
in New Spain. Since Lieutenant General Villalba had been named Commandante
General de las Armes de Nueva Españia, there were simultaneously
in the kingdom two officials from Spain whose powers encroached
on those of the Viceroy as Captain General, an office in which viceroys
"often acted with more freedom and initiative than in any other
capacity."30 One of the first acts of the new Viceroy was to inspect the new army whose organization had caused the recall of his predecessor and Lieutenant General Villalba. Despite Villalba's final report that the organized militia numbered more than 10,000, de Croix found that the militia units hardly existed in actuality (Poco mas gut sobre el papel), a condition which the Viceroy attempted to correct by frequent musters and inspections.33 De Croix found that New Spain's financial commitments to the defense of the Windard Isles had not been honored during the last two years of Cruillas' vice-regency. In the period 1761-1766, the latter had sent 1,405 convicts and vagabonds from New Spain to work on the fortifications and in the shipyard of Havana,fortifications and in the shipyard of Havana,34but payments of situados had lagged. In 1766 the situado of Havana had been set at 500,000 pesos, to be divided as follows 300,000 for the fortifications and shipyard; 100,000 for other projects in Cuba, and 100,000 for Puerto Rico.35 But in December, 1765, Havana had complained to the Minister of the Indies that no money at all had been received from Mexico City during the past year, and that work in the shipyard and on the construction of fortifications had ceased.36 On September 30, 1766, Arriaga wrote a strongly-worded letter to the Viceroy. The Intendente de Marina of Havana had informed him that no situados had been sent to Cuba for a year and one-half, and that allshipbuilding and repair had been halted. The King had ordered Arriaga to repeat to the 'Viceroy that construction must proceed, "for the Armada is the most crucial nerve of Monarchy, and in case of shortages it is to be preferred to other less important enterprises."37 The Intendentes de Tierra y Mar were instructed to list the deudas que se justifiquen (legitimate debts) of their respective ramos and to forward the statement to the viceroy for payment, in order that the credit of the crown should remain unimpaired. Beginning in January, 1768, the situados were to be increased. One million nine hundred thousand pesos were to be divided in this manner: 700,000 for all expenses of the marine, 300,000 for the fortifications of Havana, 400,000 for the pay of the garrisons, and 500,000 for the purchase of Cuban tobacco for the royal monopoly:38 The increase in the money allocated to the marine was needed for an accelerated program of naval construction and was so used. Eighteen warships were launched at the Havana shipyard during the five years of de Croix's viceregency, a greater number than had been launched in any comparable period of time.39 Extraordinary requests for funds for shipbuilding were frequent during the next few years,40 and de Croix wrote in his Instrucción to Bucareli that the demands of Havana had nullified an increase of 3,200,000 pesos in the annual income of the Real Hacienda during the period of his rule.41 In the summer of 1769, New Spain received a substantial shipment of artillery and small arms from the Peninsula,42 which enabled the Viceroy to arm shore batteries erected to support the fort of San Juan de Ulúa in the defense of Veracruz, the port which the Viceroy called "the key to the Kingdom."43 The fort of San Diego which guarded Acapulco possessed more artillery and muskets than it needed, but the Viceroy allowed the surplus: weapons to remain on the west coast. The road between Acapulco and the capital was so wretched that their transportation would have been too costly and difficult.44 Fortunately for Spain, the reorganization of its colonial defenses could be carried out in time of peace, for Europe remained quiet during the rule of de Croix and of his successor, Bucareli. In 1770 the expulsion of a British garrison from West Falkland Island by an expedition from Buenos Aires brought tension, and an embargo was placed on all transatlantic shipping from the ports of America, but the ban was lifted less than two months later when the dispute was resolved.45 Yet. the government of Spain expected war with England sooner or later. Count Aranda, President of the Council of Castile, in a dictamen addressed to the King on September 13, 1770, expressed the belief that England would attack as soon as she felt herself prepared, perhaps without a formal declaration of war. Therefore, Spain must plan to wage defensive war in America. 46 The principal ports must be reinforced. He felt no concern for the safety of the Viceroyalty of Peru, because its geographical isolation would protect it. Carlos III saw the threat of English aggression in all parts of the world, and in a personal letter to King Louis XV of France recommended that his ally devote more time and attention to his navy and less to his army. The naval forces which England maintained in the East Indies, in the Mediterranean, and in Jamaica, justified great vigilance on the part of the Bourbon powers; and Carlos had ordered that two Spanish squadrons be constantly kept in a state of readiness to put to sea.47Shortly afterwards he declared to Louis:
A Spanish historian of the reign of Carlos III has described the temper of Spain in the 1770's by stating that "the resolution to fight England was already a fact. The only things lacking were to arm and to seek an opportune moment.49 In spite of the belligerence of Count Aranda and the insistence by the King on the constant readiness of his ships, the "opportune moment" was some time in coming. There was still peace in Europe and the Indies when a change of viceroys occurred in New Spain. On September 22, 1771, Antonio Maria Bucareli, Governor and Captain General of Cuba since 1766, succeeded the Marquis de Croix. War did not appear to be imminent, and Bucareli was instructed to increase the income of the Real Hacienda and to practice economy. Within ten days of his arrival in Mexico City he discharged three battalions of militia then serving in the capital. His preliminary inspection of several militia units convinced him that they were of little value. Since his initial reduction of their numbers had received the approval of the King, he then dissolved two infantry companies and a lancer squadron of Veracruz. Because he had formed a low opinion of the Mexican militia and had been directed to economize whenever possible, Bucareli formed no new militia units until 1775, when the incipient rebellion in the English colonies of North America caused general uneasiness throughout the Spanish-American empire.50 While practicing
economy in the employment of soldiery, the Viceroy favored substantial
expenditures on the fixed defenses of Veracruz. Upon first seeing
the fort of San Juan de Ulúa at that port he had expressed
surprise at its small size, and he began at once to plan its expansion
and improvement. He convened a junta of engineers to discuss changes
in the works and, finding that the members of the junta were unable
to agree among themselves, forwarded all their opinions to Spain
for judgment at a higher level. The decision of the home government
was to call in more experts. In informing Throughout the viceregency of Bucareli the & Spain to its financially dependent colonies rose steadily.53 In Havana an accelerated program of shipbuilding which had begun in 1765 was still in progress,54 and the annual cost of the improvements of the fortifications of Puerto Rico rose to 225,000 pesos by 1775.55 To the old outposts of defense a new one had been added within the past decade: the Province of Louisiana. The loss of Canada in the Seven Years' War and the cession of Louisiana to Spain had brought Spain and England into collision along a frontier that extended from the mouth of the Mississippi River to the coast of the Pacific Northwest. The acquisition of Louisiana with its thin population and its poorly defended border made the fear of further English aggression more acute and intensified Spanish belief that war was inevitable.56 The first Spanish governor of Louisiana, Antonio de Ulloa, found the Province helpless to resist any attack from the English establishments in their new pos¬session, West Florida. An attempt to determine the optimum northern limit of Spanish control of North America was begun in 1764, when the Marquis of Rubí, who accompanied Lieutenant General Villalbe to New Spain, was charged with the inspection of the northern frontier of the viceroyalty. His lieutenant, a young engineer officer named Nicolás Lafora, spent two years traveling the line of the isolated missions and presidios of the north. His report, submitted as an informe of twelve chapters, recommended the establishment of a chain of forts on or near the Rio Grande River and the abandonment of fortified points north of the river, with two exceptions. San Antonio de Bexar in Texas and Santa Fe in New Mexico were to be left as salients projecting deep into hostile Indian territory. The presidios on the proposed line would, in the words of de Croix, "form a barrier which would serve for defense, and they should be able to aid one another."57 Such an approach to frontier defense was impossible in the case of the newly-acquired territory of Louisiana, whose eastern boundary, the Mississippi River, faced an area rapidly being penetrated by English colonists. The great distances involved, the lack of support from Cuba, and the hostility of the French population combined to frustrate the efforts of Ulloa to establish a series of forts on the river. No real progress toward strengthening the Province was made until after Ulloa was ousted from New Orleans by a revolt of the colonists in 1768. His successor, Lieutenant General Alejandro O'Reilly, the organizer of the Cuban militia and the friend of Bucareli, then Captain General of the island, reduced Louisiana to obedience and organized a citizen militia. By 1770 this force nuMbered.1,040 men, who were commanded by native French colonial officers and trained by Spanish regulars. The small force could not serve as a bulwark against the English, but it could be "an obstacle that would delay them, at least temporarily, in their attempts to get at the mines of Mexico. . . ."58 When the conflict between England and her colonies in North America began in 1775, Spanish concern for the safety of Louisiana and Spanish America in general grew. In June of that year, Count Aranda, then Ambassador to France, expressed his fears in a letter to the Marquis of Grimaldi, the Spanish Minister of State. If the North Americans should win their independence, he predicted, Louisiana would be the first object of their expansion. Whether they became independent or not, the English colonies "must be viewed as a growing power for our subjection."59 Grimaldi's reply to Aranda in August was equally gloomy. He feared that no possible program of colonization from Spain could increase the population of Louisiana enough to meet the tide of British migration moving westward toward the Mississippi River. The English would always be able to raise armies which Spanish Louisiana could not match. To develop the province and to erect strongly garrisoned forts would only cause the conquest of Louisiana to be more of a challenge to the English. In short, he. concluded, "the evil has no remedy." 60 After fighting between British troops and Massachusetts colonists had begun, Governor Luís de Unzaga of Louisiana became alarmed. He sent a vessel to Philadelphia, ostensibly to buy flour, but actually to discover how serious was the rift between England and her colonies. The reports which he received were not encouraging, and he feared attack from both loyalists and rebels. Lacking troops and strong fortifications, he wrote to Spain that he could only follow the advice given in 1770: if attacked, fight a delaying action and fall back to Mexico.61 In September, 1775 the Marquis of Grimaldi wrote to Count Aranda in Paris that war might break out at any time between the Bourbon allies and England, and that England could not possibly muster forces for the subjection of the French and Spanish colonies before the autumn of 1776. The defenses of the Indies must be strengthened and the colonial forces supplied with war material at once. Precautions must be taken against a sudden assault with or without a declaration of war. He warned that "prudence dictates that the two Courts take without delay effective steps to defend their respective possessions, as if war were already upon us.62 In New Spain
Viceroy Bucareli turned his attention to the militia, whose numbers
had remained static since 1772. By 1776 the strength of the enrolled
militiamen was increased from 6,837 to 14,000, and the number of
regular troops stationed in the kingdom rose from 3,754 to 4,527.63
More soldiers were sent to reinforce the Cuban garrisons; the Regiment
of Spain, for instance, being ordered to Havana in February, 1776.65
With the troop transports were to come four frigates to cruise the
Windward Isles, the Antilles, the Mexican Gulf, and "all the
other places enemy squadrons could sail to our Dominions."65
A major threat to the neutrality of continental Europe was the growing activity of American commerce raiders, particularly in the English Channel, where they so successfully harassed English shipping that marine insurance rates rose to more than twenty percent by 1777.67 Count Aranda, from Paris, expressed amazement at the American successes at sea. The maritime strength which the colonists displayed was incredible to him, and he speculated that a large percentage of the Americans were seamen because of their extensive foreign commerce. Although the British also took many prizes, their losses exceeded their gains, because the prizes taken by the American vessels were more numerous and of greater value,68 The success of the rebel privateers prompted José de Gálvez to advise Bucareli, in a secret letter of September 20, 1776, how the American ships should be received in the ports of Spanish America:
As if this letter might seem ambiguous to officials in a position to admit American vessels, José de Gálvez followed it a month later with more bluntly worded instructions:
The first Spanish colony in America to face the dilemma of giving covert aid to the American rebels while remaining officially neutral was the Province of Louisiana. In May, 1776, a Captain George Gibson and twenty-five men disguised as traders appeared in New Orleans from upriver bearing a letter from Major General Charles Lee, second in command to General George Washington. The letter solicited Spanish aid for the American colonists, warned of the dangers to the Spanish colonies if the English won, and offered to take Pensacola for the Spaniards. Governor Luis de Unzaga, elderly, infirm, and hoping for retirement after forty-one years' service in America, referred the propositions to Spain.72 To José de Gálvez the time seemed propitious to aid the Americans, although not as flagrantly as France was then doing.73 In a dictamen addressed to the Council of Castile, he urged, "Let us establish indirect and secret intelligence with the American colonies, inspiring them to vigorous resistance, and hoping for the diversion of English forces.74 In the summer of 1776 Spain moved to strengthen the defenses of Louisiana and to use New Orleans as a distribution center for secret aid to the Americans. A royal order of September 19 named young Colonel Bernardo de Gálvez interim Governor, and instructed him to increase the militia strength, to make accurate charts of the Mississippi River, and to establish intelligence agents among the English settlements and the Indians,74. The sum of 40,000 pesos was added to the situado of the Province to be employed in "objectives useful to that colony, as a barrier against the English in that part of the continent and the Province of Texas,76 and complete freedom of commerce was allowed between Louisiana and all the ports of Mexico for the first time.77 Governor Unzaga was informed that the Governor of Havana would receive by the monthly mail vessel from La Corufla goods to be delivered to the Americans by way of New Orleans. In the meantime the rebels should be given whatever surplus of Mexican gunpowder there might be, and surplus firearms would be sent from Havana.78 Before the end of 1776, an American party had departed upriver with 9,000 pounds of gunpowder, the first product of New Spain to be giver as aid to the enemies of England in the war.79 In January 1777, the monthly paquebot sailed from La Coruna for Havana carrying medicine and cloth for uniforms. In February a second shipment was made by the paquebot, and in Havana 300 muskets with bayonets and 100 quintales (10,000 pounds) of powder were added.80 By means of a complicated but transparent subterfuge which did not deceive the watchful English in West Florida, material for the Americans was declared to be condemned royal stores unfit for use by the Spanish troops. Such material, falsely labeled, was shipped to New Orleans to be "sold."81 By the end of Bernardo de Gálvez' first year as Governor, $70,000 worth of arms, clothing, and gunpowder had been sent to the upper Ohio River after repeated requests by George Morgan, the commander of Fort Pitt. 82 Almost simultaneously with the arrival of the first shipment of stores from New Orleans, a merchant of Bilbao, Spain, received 70,000 pesos from the crown to be spent in goods to be picked up by American ships.83 In anticipation of increased traffic, Count Floridablanca, now the principal minister of Carlos III, announced the opening of a regular paquebot service between Havana and New Orleans.84 Throughout 1777 Spain continued preparations for war with England, although her approach toward belligerency was not as overt as that of France. While the Spanish government sought to reinforce colonial defenses, it did not wish to provoke an English preventive attack by abrupt and large-scale troop and ship movements. Count Floridablance recommended to Vergennes that France make cautious movements of men and vessels to the West Indies. He felt that neither of the Bourbon powers could know when war would begin, but that it would be better for France to emulate Spain and to move selected units overseas with discreet intervals between sailings.85 Spain's schedule did not call for war in 1777 if it could be avoided. Although there were in Spanish ports 113 warships of all types completely armed, it would be November before Cádiz would have 20 ships of the line ready for sea, and in the same month there would be 9 ships of the line in the West Indies available for the protection of the Spanish colonies of North America. The government of Spain believed in 1777 that England had not committed her full naval strength to the suppression of the American revolt, and that she still held her heaviest warships in reserve for possible action against France and Spain.86 Yet in August, Spain felt Strong enough to reject an English protest concerning the admittance of American corsairs into Spanish harbors. The Spanish reply was that the English complaint could not be considered at a time when the Royal Navy was harassing the legitimate commerce of Spain and other neutral nations.87 The involvement of New Spain and its dependent provinces in the mother country's preparations for war increased after the initial shipments of gunpowder from New Orleans in 1776. There was a constant shortage of this explosive, so essential, to war, to mining, and to the quarrying of stone. Since the powder factory in Mexico City was the sole source of supply for all the Spanish colonies in the northern hemisphere, José de Gálvez expressed concern about the ability of that establishment to meet the demands of an emergency. In July 1777, when the Minister of the Indies ordered Viceroy Bucareli to send 1,500 quintales of gunpowder to Havana, he directed that the output of the Mexican factory be increased. At the time, Havana needed the explosive because that port had just sent 1,500 quintales to Cartagena de Indias, whose magazines were empty. Havana was the distribution point for money and munitions to the other islands, to Cartagena, to Caracas, and to Louisiana. The shipment to Cartagena was only one example of the continuing need. Actually, 9,902 quintales would have been needed to fill the magazines at Havana and to allow that port to meet the requests of other points. Therefore, instead of ordering that any specific quantity be sent to Cuba in the near future, Gálvez directed that the Viceroy continue to send "the greatest quantity that may be possible.88 In this period of transition from nominal neutrality to open belligerence, New Spain was also asked for aid in the recruitment of manpower to defend Louisiana. In August 1777, Viceroy Bucareli was informed that an officer from New Orleans would soon arrive in Mexico City to recruit men for a second battalion of infantry to serve in Louisiana, for the Province had only one battalion of regular troops.89 The recruiting party, consisting of a Sub-Lieutenant Godeau, four sergeants, eight corporals, and twelve enlisted men, was given 1,200 pesos for expenses when they arrived in the capital,90 but the prospect of military service in Louisiana had attracted only thirty recruits by July 1778. At that time the Viceroy ordered criminals who had been convicted of minor crimes to be drafted into the new Louisiana battalion, an action that was approved by José de Gálvez.91 Gálvez acted also to relieve the chronic shortage of foodstuffs in Louisiana. He directed Bucareli to order the port officials of Veracruz to fill without prior approval from the capital all orders for provisions presented to them by the officers of ships from Louisiana,92 where Gálvez continued to build an army.93 The aid to the North American insurgents before her entry into the war may be viewed as one aspect of Spain's general policy of opposition to the British along the Mississippi River, a "new application of the divide et impera policy".94 Yet aid to the new republic might defeat the ultimate Spanish objective: the preservation of her American empire. As an armed opponent of England, the young nation was to be encouraged, but as the founder of a new and vigorous political force that would menace Spanish America, to be hindered. Count Floridablanca, foreseeing the dangers of an independent Anglo-America, recommended the proper Spanish counter-measures in 1777.
In spite of
Spain's steady course toward war, her government attempted to maintain
the appearance of neutrality until February 6, 1778, when France
signed two treaties with the United States, one of amity and commerce,
the other of conditional and defensive alliance. The treaties had
hardly been signed when Spain began to pressure the British government
to accept the mediation of the Spanish monarch, a service far which
he expected to be rewarded. On March 22, 1779, José de Gálvez ordered an embargo on all shipping from the ports of New Spain, and warned Viceroy Bucareli that neutrality would soon be ended:
On April 3, 1779, Count Floridablanca sent a virtual ultimatum to England which demanded that she accept Spanish mediation of the war on terms completely unacceptable to the former. Before the communication could have been answered, Spain and France signed the Convention of Aranjuez, which provided that Spain should enter the war if England refused the demands made by the Convention, one of which was the restitution of Gibraltar.98 The actual declaration
of war against Great Britain was written in Madrid on May 18, 1779,
but New Spain had received prior warning. The orders prohibiting
the departure of vessels and giving the Viceroy notice that neutrality
would soon be ended had been followed on May 12 by an order which
forbade all royal officials, no matter what their ranks, to leave
New Spain without permission.99 The declaration of war
could hardly have come at a more inopportune time. Viceroy Bucareli
had died suddenly on April 9th. The task of executing the first
war measures fell upon the Audiencia of Mexico, until a new Viceroy
could be designated. Footnotes to Chapter I 1. England had apparently hoped to gain control of access to the Mississippi through possession of West Florida, but her negotiators at the peace conference were ignorant of the details of the physical geography of the Gulf Coast of North America. The Duke of Choiseul, anxious to retain control of the river mouth for France's ally, had convinced the English that Lake Pontchartrain was the most desirable entry to the river, and by so doing had retained the Island of Orleans for Spain. Wilson Lyon, Louisiana in French Diplomacy, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1934), pp. 23-24. 2. Quoted in Cesáreo Fernández Duro, Armada Española desde la unión de Castilla,y de Aragón, 9 Vols. (Madrid: Tipografico Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, Impresores de la Real Casa, 1901–1915),.Vol. 7. , p. 46 (hereafter referred to as Fernádez Duro, Armada). 3. Manuel Danvila y Collado, Reinado de Carlos, III, 6 Vols. (Madrid: El Progreso Editorial,-1892-1896), Vol. 2, p. 216 (hereafter referred to as Danvila, Carlos, III.) 4. Fernández Duro, Armada, Vol. 7, p. 108. 5. Lyle N. McAlister, The Reorganization of the Army of New Spain, 1763-1766, The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (February 1953), P. 7 Cruillas had found that arms and equipment for the militia almost non-existent. On December 3, 1761, he wrote Madrid that he needed 20,000 muskets to arm his troops On August 30, 1762, the Minister of the Indies answered him by reassuring him that the guns "will be sent." By the date of Arriaga's reply Havana had already fallen and peace talks were underway. Arriaga to Cruillas, AGNM, RC, Vol. 82, August 30, 1762, expediente 66,-fol. 34 [hereafter referred to as McAlister, Reorganization of the Army). 6. Defensa del Reyno: sobre gastos que se hicieron con motivo de la Guerra declarada a los Ingleses en el año 1762," AGNM, Historia, vol. 44, Fol. 5 This is an account which was rendered to Viceroy Revillagigedo on May 3, 1793; it forms part of a history of the Real Hacienda which the viceroy had ordered to be written, and which was eventually published.as: Fabian de Fonseca, and Carlos de Urrutía, Historia general; de real hacienda escrita pror orden del Virey Conde de Revillagigedo, 6 vols. (Mexico: Imprenta de Vicente García Torres, 1845-1853). 7. Julio LeRiverend Brusone, Relaciones entre Neuva España y Cuba (1508-1820, Revista de Historia de América,, Nums. 37-38 (Enero-Diciembre de 1955) , pp. 58, 88 89 (hereafter referred to as España y Cuba). 8. Alejan6dro de Humboldt, Ensayo político sobre la Isla de Cuba (La Habana: Publicaciones del Archivo Nacional de Cuba, L., 1960), pp. 114-115 [hereafter referred to as Humboldt, Cuba] 9. Despacho del Comisario de Marina D. Lorenzo de Montalvo al Ministro de Indias, Bailio Fr. D. Julián de Arriaga, sobre evacuación de la Plaza de la Habana por los Ingleses,,, printed in extenso in Fernández Duro, Armada, Vol. 7, p. 114. Montalvo stated that the English had stolen everything that they could carry, and that machinery and buildings had been wrecked or burned. This was contrary to the terms of peace, which provided that all port facilities should be delivered to Spain in the same condition in which they had been found at the time of capitulation. 10. "1763 Havana restituda en 12 de Julio," AGNM, Historia, Vol. 425, fols. 79-83. 11. Arriaga to Cruillas, June 18, 1763, AGNM, RC. Vol. 83, expediente 80, no pagination. Mew Spain regularly sent subsidies to Havana to meet the expenses of its naval squadron and its soldiery, and made similar payments to other points. Besides these regular disbursements, there were frequent extraordinary bills to be paid from Mexico, for while on campaign the squadron purchased food and supplies where and when it was necessary. After a cruise by the Havana warships claims for payment came in to Mexico City, by way of Spain, from all ports at which the ships had called, and the process of debt collection was extremely slow. One case may be cited as an example of the procedure involved. In 1762 the Governor of Spanish Santo Domingo had furnished the Havana ships with a quantity of cordage and pitch. Santo Domingo then informed Madrid of the quantity and value of the supplies. From the Ministry of the Indies an expendiente eventually came to Mexico City, instructing the viceroy to reimburse the Cajas of Santo Domingo for the amount owed, 3,343 pesos. The processing of this debt had required a year and one-half. Arriga to Cruillas, June 27, 1763. Ibid., expediente 86, no pagination. The warships of Spain frequently sailed with insufficient food and gear because of the widespread dishonesty of the purveyors, who stole from the goods delivered to the ships or who connived with royal officials to purchase, at the expense of the crown, non existent supplies. A detailed account of the nature of these frauds can be found in Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, Noticias Secretas de America (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Mar Océan, 1953). pp. 65-70. Similarly, ships of the British Navy frequently found themselves short of food and essential supplies because of thefts by their victuallers and dockyard officials. Robert G. Albion, Forests and Sea Power: The Timber Problem of the Royal, Navy, 1652-1862 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926), pp. 47ff. 12. Conde de Ricla to Cruillas, November 24, 1763, AGNM, Historia, Vol. 425, fols. 51-56. The governor thanked Cruillas for an emergency remission of 900,000 pesos, but said that it was not enough, and that the English had seized 2,440,000 pesos during their occupation. 13. The total population of Spanish Florida in 1763 was 3,096, a figure which included women, children, slaves, and soldiers. It is not clear that all of these withdrew from Florida when the provinces passed under the British flag, but the overwhelming majority did so. Verne E. Chatelain, The Defenses of Spanish Florida, 1565 to 1763 (Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1941), pp. 67, 128. 14. Clinton N. Howard, The British Development of West Florida (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1947), p. 11. 15. Arriaga to Cruillas,
July 12, 1763, AGM, RC, Vol. 84, expediente 273, no pagination. 16. Ricardo Wall to Cruillas, August 21, 1763, ibid., Vol. 83, expediente 136, no pagination. 17. Arriaga to Cruillas, September 15, 1763, ibid., expediente 142, no pagination. 18. Danvila, Carlos III, Vol. 2, p. 110. 19. Allen Christelow, French Interest in the Spanish Empire during the Ministry of the Duc de Choiseul, 1759–1771, The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. XVI, No. 4 (November 1941), p. 523. 20. Arriaga to Cruillas, September 27, 1763, AGNM, RC, Vol. 83, expediente 167, no pagination. 21. Fernandez Duro, Armada, Vol. 7, p. 118. No ships were constructed at Havana until 1765, when three were launched. 22. The center of the maritime post was to be La Coruna. On the first day of each month a packet boat was to leave with correspondence for the Indies. The mail would be left at Havana where it would be picked up and carried to the principal ports of the Spanish colonies in the northern hemisphere. A separate vessel was to leave La Coruna on the same dates for Rio de la Plata. The provisional regulations of the correo maritimo were outlined for Cruillas in the fall of 1764. Arriaga to Cruillas, October 18, 1764, AGNM, RC, Vol. 85, expediente 91, no pagination. . 23. Cruillas had first written to Spain asking for the protection of New Spain's coastal waters on November 28, 1764. Arriaga's response to this letter had been noncommittal. Arriaga to Cruillas, February 9, 1765, ibid., Vol. 86, expediente 53, fol. 69. 24. Arriaga to Cruillas, April 11, 1765, ibid., expediente 110, fols. 224-225. 25. McAlister, The Reorganization of the Army, p. 8. 26. The Governor and Captain General was Antonio Maria Bucareli, who was to become Viceroy of New Spain in 1771. Bernard E. Bobb, The Vicereigency of Antonio María Bucareli in New Spain, 1771-1779 (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1962), p. 88 [hereafter referred to as Bobb, Bucareli). O'Reilly also inspected the fortifications of San Juan, Puerto Rico, in 1765, and after a consultation with the Chief Engineer, Tomas O'Daly, recommended that the garrison be increased and works repaired. Nicolas Cabrillana, Las fortificaciones militares en Puerto Rico, Revista de Indias, Vol.XXVII, Nus. 107-108 (Enero-Junio, 1967), pp. 172-173. O'Reilly's recommendations caused the King to send two battalions of infantry and an artillery company to the island and to order New Spain to send 100,000 pesos annually to Puerto Rico for the repair and improvement of the fortifications. Arriaga to Cruillas, September 20, 1765, AGNM, RC. Vol. 27, expediente 222, fols. 115-115v. 27.McAlister, The Reorganization of the Army, pp. 16-17. 28. Arriaga to Cruillas, May 21, 1765, AGNM, RC. Vol. 86, expediente 155, fols. 331-331v. The first situado was inadequate, for Spain had undertaken to redeem more than two million livres in paper money which was then in circulation in Louisiana. The Mexican silver promptly disappeared from circulation into private hoards, Vicente Rodriguez Casado, Primeros aftels de dominacion España en la Luisiana (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1942), p. 116. In May 1767, the king ordered the situado increased to 250,000 pesos. Arriaga to Cruillas, May 19, 1767, AGNM, RC, Vol. 90, expediente 133, fols. 227-228. 29. John W. Caughey,
Bernardo de Gálvez in Louisiana, 1776-1783 (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1934), pp. 12-13 [hereafter referred to as Caughey,
Gálvez]. 31.McAlister, Reorganization
of the Army, pp. 28-29. Before his departure Villalba submitted
a report which showed the strength of the army of New Spain. to be 2,341
regulars and 10,698 militiamen. Ibid., p. 28. 34. Cruillas to Arriaga, August 11, 1766, AGNM, CV, Vol. 9, expediente 987, fol. 409. Cruillas stated in this letter that he could have sent more forzados. Although he had offered many more, officers of the ships sent to take them to Havana had rejected many, because they were not strong enough for the work. 35. Arriaga to Cruillas, March 25, 1766, AGM, RC, Vol. 88, expediente 110, fol. 82. 36. Arriaga to Cruillas, March 25, 1766, ibid., expediente 39, fol. 81. 37. Arriaga to de Croix, September 30, 1766, ibid., Vol. 89, expediente 190, fol. 65. The author of the complaints to Spain about the stoppage of work in the shipyard was Lorenzo de Montalvo, who is referred to in correspondence both as Comisaria and Intendente. This able officer, who had spent his whole working life in naval administration, had come to Havana in 1756 bearing a title previously unknown in America: Intendente de Marina y Director de la Real Fabrica de Navios. The date of his appointment antedates by six years the establishment of an Intendencia de Guerra y Hacienda in Cuba. Luis Navarro Garcia, Intendencias en Indias (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos de Sevilla, 1959), pp. 18-19. Haring had previously accepted 1764 as the date of the first intendency in the American colonies. Haring, Spanish Empire in America, p. 134. 38. Arriaga to de Croix, February 2, 1768, ibid., Vol. 92, expediente 47, fols. 85-87. 39. Humboldt, Cuba, p. 116. 40. Between 1766 and 1770 ten royal cedulas directed New Spain to pay the Intendente de Marina at Havana varying amounts to meet emergency expenses not covered by the annual situados. 41. 1De Croix, Instrucción, p. 100, num. 114. 42. Arriaga to de Croix, June 20, 1769, AGNM, RC, Vol. 94, expedientes 135 and 135 bis, fols. 247-248v. The shipment had left Cádiz on June 8, 1769, in seven merchant ships which also transported the Regiment of Sevilla to garrison duty in Havana. The cargo for Veracruz included thirty-six pieces of artillery, ten mortars, and 2,130 muskets, together with 38,000 projectiles of varying calibres. 43. De Croix, Instrucción, 115, num. 146. 44. Ibid., p. 117,
num. 152. Travel over the road from Acapulco to the capital was mostly
by mule-back, and the passage of wheeled vehicles was virtually impossible
during the eighteenth century. In the first decade of the nineteenth
century a better highway was planned, but great blocks of stone lay
along the road for generations without ever being placed in position.
When Teodoro de Croix traveled the road in 1767 to assume the post of
castellán at the Acapulco fort, he called the road "impracticable."
William L. Schurz, The Manila Galleon (New York: E. P. Dutton
and Company, 1939), pp. 386-387 [hereafter referred to as Schurz, Manila
Galleon]. Eighteenth century guns were inordinately heavy, by modern
standards, in relation to their power. A thirty-two pounder gun weighed
more than three tons. Many of the guns mounted at Acapulco had come
from Manila, since transportation from Manila, which had an excellent
foundry, was more practicable than transportation from Veracruz. 46. Dictamen dado por el Conde de Aranda, Presidente del Consejo, al rey Carlos III, en Madrid a 13 de Septiembre de 1770, printed in Danvila, Carlos III, Vol. 4, p. 129. 47. Carta de Carlos III a Luis XV, Aranjuez, 27 de Mayo de 1771," printed in ibid., Vol. 4, p. 152. 48. Carta de Carlos III a Luis XV, Aranjuez, 27 de Mayo de 1771," printed in ibid., Vol. 4, p. 154. The Earl of Sandwich, who took office as First Lord of the Admiralty in London in 1771, wrote to Lord North:
George Martelli, Jemmy Twitcher: A Life of the Fourth Earl of Sandwich, 1718–1742 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1962), p. 89. 49. Danvila, Carlos III, Vol. 4, p. 412. 50. Bob, Bucareli, pp. 89-90. 51. Arriaga to Bucareli, September 20, 1775, AGNM, RC, Vol. 106, expediente 226, fols. 432-433. 52. Bobb, Bucareli, p. 148. 53. The situados paid to the Windward Isles and to Louisiana and distributed through Havana were as follows for the years 1772, 1774, and 1778: 3,146,332 pesos, 4,324,347 pesos, and 4,531,910 pesos. Ibid., p. 226. Bobb states that figures for the missing years are either unclear or missing. 54. Humboldt, Cuba, p. 117. Thirteen ships were built at Havana during Bucareli's viceregency. 55. Arriaga to Bucareli,
November 6, 1775, AGNM, RC, Vol. 106, expediente 271, fols.
491-491v. 57. De Croix, Instrucción,
p. 128, num. 128. Lafora's reports of the conditions of the frontier
presidios, their garrisons and their equipment were almost uniformly
unfavorable. His account is filled with descriptions of unpaid, ill-equipped
and soldiers 58. Caughey, Gálvez, p. 42. O'Reilly maintained seven fortified points on the Mississippi River betWeen the mouth of the river and the mouth of the Missouri River. 59. Danvila, Carlos III, Vol. 4, p. 415. p. 416. 60. Ibid., p. 416. 61. Caughey, Gálvez, p. 54. 62. Danvila, Carlos III, Vol. 4, p. 421. 63. Bobb, Bucareli, pp. 101-102, 108. 64. José de Gálvez to Bucareli, August 6, 1776, Vol. 108, expediente 66, fol. 138. The burden of the regiment's annual payroll; 200,656 pesos, became an additional expense to New Spain. 65. José de Gálvez to Bucareli, February 29, 1776, ibid., Vol. 107, expediente 58, fols. 100-100v. Aranda reported the dispatch of the cruisers to Vergennes, the French Foreign Minister, who was pleased by the move. Danvila, Carlos,III, Vol. 4, p.452. 66. José de Gálvez to Bucareli, February 28, 1776, ibid., expediente 50, fols. 87-88v. Julian de Arriaga, who had served as Minister of the Indies since the fall of the Marquis of Ensenada in 1754, had died in January, 1776. An unsociable man, incapable of forming friendships, he had been humorless, efficient, and incorruptible, but his undoubted talents as an administrator had not been appreciated by Carlos III, who had always regarded him with suspicion because of Arriaga's friendship with Jesuits. Fernandez Duro, Armada, Vol. 7, p. 187. Bucareli, after a survey of New Spain's resources for war, requested that artillery of all calibres be sent from Spain. Gálvez in his reply admitted that Spain could not satisfy even its domestic needs for guns, and he wrote that negotiations were underway to buy naval guns from Carron, Scotland (the well-known large-calibre pieces known as "carronades"). Bucareli was directed to plan the establishment of a foundry for bronze cannon in New Spain. Gálvez to Bucareli, October 6, 1776, ibid., VOL. 109, expediente 21, fols. 36-37. For the next two years surveys, plans, and reports on the projected foundry were made, but it was never built. Bobb, Bucareli pp. 111-112. 67. Samuel F. Bemis,
The Diplomacy of the American Revolution (New York: D. Appleton-Century
Company, 1935), pp. 54-55. 69. On August 23, 1775, England had issued a Proclamation of Rebellion which forbade all intercourse with the rebellious colonies, and the seizure of rebel shipping began. The proclamation could not be effectively' enforced because of the shortage of British warships, and the Americans were quick to begin reprisals. "The sea is now over-spread with privateers on every part," the Earl of Sandwich wrote to Lord Howe in 1776, "and the demands for convoys and cruisers is so great that we know not how to supply them." Mackesy, War for America, p. 173. 70. José
de Gálvez to
Bucareli. September 20,: 1776, AGNM, RC, Vol. 108, expediente
157, reservada 129, fols. 320-321v. 72. Caughey, Gálvez, p. 55. 73. A clause in the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 had forbidden France to receive the vessels of the enemies of Great Britain in her ports, and this ban had been renewed by the Treaty of Paris in 1763. From the beginning of the American rebellion France's violation of this prohibition had been so flagrant that Count Vergennes expected war with England as early as 1777. Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution, P. 53. 74. Quoted in Yela Ultrilla, Independencia, Vol. II, p. 78. 75. Caughey, Gálvez, pp. 67-68. Unzaga surrendered his office in January, 1777. The new governor was greatly disturbed by the defenceless state of New Orleans. The city had no fortifications to protect it, and in Gálvez' opinion, there would not be enough time to build them before hostilities began. There was not a boat at his disposal, and he complained to his uncle, the Minister of the Indies, as follows:
Carta de D. Bernardo de Gálvez, en que da cuenta de sus preparativos para defendarse de los Inglesse, Dommentos historicos de la Florida y Luisiana, siqlos XVI al XVIII (Madrid: Libreria General de Victoriano Suárez, 1912), p. 315. 78. José de Gálvez to Bucareli, November 25, 1776, AGNM, RC, Vol. 109, expediente 107, fols. 95-95v. 77. José de Gálvez to Bucareli, November 25, 1776, ibid., expediente 106, fol. 94. 78. Yela Utrilla, Independencia, Vol. 1, p. 108. 79. The gunpowder
arrives just in time to save Forts Pitt and Wheeling from being taken
by a British and Indian force. More gunpowder was shipped from New Orleans
at the same time by Oliver Pollock, an Irish-American who figured prominently
in the clandestine transactions with the Americans. Caughey, Gálvez,
p. 87. 82. Caughey, Gálvez, pp. 91-92. The exact amount of money and supplies given by Spain directly to the Americans has not been determined. Spanish and American archival records of the disbursements are incomplete. Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution, pp. 91-92. 83. The merchant of Bilbao, Diego de Gardoquí, was our Beaumarchais in the matter of aiding the colonies, Yela Utrilla, Independencia, Vol. I, pp. 242-243. 84. Floridablance to Bucareli, May 28, 1777, AGNM, RC, Vol. 111, expediente 51, fol. 107. 85. Danvila, Carlos III, Vol. 4, p. 496. After Count Aranda, Spanish Ambassador at Versailles, had delivered this communication, Vergennes read it, and he expressed bewilderment at a reference to the port El Guarico. He asked Amanda if it were a French possession. Aranda told Vergennes that El Guarico was another name for Cap François; and he later wrote to Madrid that "the French Ministry is lost in regard to American geography." Yela Utrilla, Independencia, Vol. I, p. 201. 86. Memoria hecha por el Gobierno de España para presentarla a la Corte francesa, S. Lorenzo 17 de Octubre de 1777, printed in extenso in Yela Utrilla,Independencia, Vol. II, p. 152. Spain had overestimated British naval strength, which was at the time insufficient to maintain a blockade of the North American coast and to arrest American traffic with the Continent and with neutrals in the West Indies. Nine-tenths of the supplies that reached the rebels came by sea. Mackesy, The War for America, pp. 88-89. 87. Danvila, Carlos III, Vol. 4, p. 487. 88. José de Gálvez to Bucareli, July 22, 1777, AGNM, RC, Vol. 111, expediente 176, fols. 282-282v. The Viceroy had anticipated Gálvez' plan to increase the capacity of the capital's powder mill before he received the letter cited, and he had already begun expansion of the existing facilities by May. Same to same, ibid., expediente 252, fol. 411. 89. José de Gálvez to Bucareli, August 15, 1777, ibid., expediente 239, fol. 396. 90. José de Gálvez to Bucareli, September 25, 1778, ibid., vol. 115, expediente 34, fol. 54. 91. José de Gálvez to Bucareli, December 21, 1778, ibid., expediente 154, fol. 387. In July 1779, there were 106 Mexicans serving with Bernardo de Gálvez in Louisiana. Caughey, Gálvez, p. 139. 92. José de Gálvez to Bucareli, October 29, 1778, AGNM, RC, Vol. 115, expediente 91, fol. 230. 93. Caughey, Gálvez, p. 137. From 1778 to 1779 the number of regular troops in Louisiana rose from 437 to 769; from 1777 to 1779 the number of militiamen-rose from 136 to 1,500. 94. Ibid., p. 101. 95. Yela Utrilla, Independencia, Vol. I, p. 184. 96. Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution, PP. 78-79. 97. José de Gálvez to Bucareli, March 22, 1779, AGNM, RC, Vol. 116, expediente 148, fols. 254-254v, and same to same, ibid., expediente 207, fols. 294-294v. 98. The Convention, ratified at Versailles, April 28th, provided for Spain's entrance into the war, "in case England should refuse Charles III's final offer, so studiously composed as to be unacceptable." Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution, p. 80. 99.José de
Gálvez to Bucareli, May 12th, AGNM, RC, Vol. 118, expediente
19, fol. 29.
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