SPAIN ENTERS THE WAR FOR AMERICA Martín
de Mayorga, the forty-seventh Viceroy of New Spain, was born in Spain
in the third decade of the eighteenth century. In 1773, when appointed
Captain General and President of the Audiencia of Guatemala, he held
the rank of Mariscal de Campo and was a Cabellero of the Order of
Alcantara.1 He still occupied this post in Guatemala when
Viceroy Bucareli died on April 9, 1779. The Real Acuerdo 2
opened the Cedula de Providencia, or Mortaja, which José de
Gálvez, Minister of the Indies, had sent from Spain shortly
before Bucareli's death, and found that the paper provided that the
successor to the Viceroy should be the President of Guatemala. Matías de Gálvez, who had just been appointed by the crown as President of Guatemala to succeed Mayorga, was the elder brother of the Minister of the Indies and the father of Bernardo, Governor of Louisiana. José de Gálvez had undoubtedly expected that Matías would assume the presidency of Guatemala before it might be necessary to implement the Mortaja which appointed a successor to Bucareli. The mail had made an unusually swift crossing of the Atlantic Ocean, and the Mortaja had outdistanced Matías. Thus Mayorga became Viceroy of New Spain by chance; it was a position which he had neither desired nor sought, and he was the object of José de Gálvez' resentment during his term of office. He received only half the salary of his predecessor,3 and his correspondence reveals that he was almost constantly at odds with the Minister of the Indies, who never seemed to forgive him for unintentionally blocking the ambition of the elder Gálvez.4 A courier dispatched by the interim governing body of New Spain, the Audiencia Gobierna, made a swift journey, traversing the wretched roads from Mexico City to Guatemala in seven days. The Audiencia, well aware of the almost impassable trails between the two capitals, ordered hasty repairs made to the roads and bridges to facilitate the passage of the new Viceroy and his entourage;5 but Mayorga, who had started northward upon receiving the news, found travel slow and difficult. He did not arrive in Mexico City until August 23rd, and one of his first letters to Spain from the capital recounted the hardships of the trip. When he learned in Puebla that Spain had declared war upon England, he attempted to speed his progress, but with little success.6 After he had taken formal possession of his office, Mayorga turned at once to the emergency created by the state of war. The declaration of hostilities, written in Spain on May 18th, had been received in Mexico on August 13th,7 and notice of the formal opening of hostilities had been followed by an order to cease all communication and trade with the enemy.8 The Audiencia Gobierna had begun to initiate war measures before the arrival of the new Viceroy. After a courier had been sent to meet Mayorga, a million pesos had been sent to Veracruz with instructions to forward half of it to Havana, and to divide the remainder between the governors of Louisiana and Yucatan. Food and gunpowder had also been sent to Havana and Yucatan. The port of San Blas had been alerted to be ready to send money and supplies to the Philippine Islands, for Manila was as yet unaware of Spain's entry into the war.9 Mayorga, after having reviewed the actions taken by the Audiencia Gobierna, praised them, particularly the preliminary orders which had been given by the Regente Francisco Roma y Rosell, who had personally assumed the interim duties of Captain General.10 Mayorga inherited a military establishment whose strength and effectiveness are debatable. There were in 1779 a total of approximately 7,000 regular army troops in New Spain, plus urban and provincial militia units numbering approximately 7,000. These figures do not include 1,997 men stationed at the presidios of the Interior Provinces under the command of the Commandant General, Teodoro de Croix.11 The principal fortified point designed to prevent seaborne invasion of the east coast of the realm was the Castillo de San Juan de Ulúa, which guarded the major port, Veracruz. Construction of the fort had begun in 1863, and since that date it had been enlarged and altered several times. The most recent reconstruction and addition had been made under the direction of Viceroy Bucareli. Four and one-half million pesos had been spent on its rehabilitation, and its engineers regarded the condition of the fort as satisfactory.12 There were minor fortifications on the coast of Tabasco and Yucatán, but most of the Spanish money and care were devoted to the maintenance of the defense of Veracruz. All thought concerning the defense of the eastern seaboard of New Spain was limited in scope, and plans were based "on the stubborn insistence that the English . . . must attack the Castle of San Juan de Ulúa.13 In the event that an enemy penetrated the defenses of Veracruz and advanced toward the capital, he would encounter the new fort of San Carlos at Perote,.on the road to Mexico City.14 The point most likely to be an objective of attack from the Pacific Ocean was Acapulco, the American terminus of Philippine-American navigation and the eastern port of the Manila galleon. Acapulco was guarded by the Castillo of San Diego, which was undergoing reconstruction after having been damaged by an earthquake in 1776. For some reason the enemies of Spain felt this fort to be as strong as the works of San Juan de Ulúa or those of Cartagena de Indias, and even if its reputation was undeserved, it had in the past served effectively to keep invaders at a distance.14 The
eastern sea approaches to New Spain were protected by a naval squadron
based on Havana, whose strength in 1779 was five 70-gun ships and
three frigates.16 Immediately after the news of the declaration
of war reached America this squadron, commanded by Lieutenant General
Juan Bautista Bonet, surprised and captured a convoy of sixteen British
merchantmen homeward bound from Jamaica.17 Regardless of
the activity of Bonet's small force, the most potent sea defense of
the Spanish possessions around the Gulf of Mexico was the French navy
in the West Indies. By 1779, the squadrons of d'Estaing, Vaudreuil, and LaMotte-Picquet had taken the British islands of Dominica, St. Vincent, and Grenada, the last-named being the rich¬est sugar island of the Lesser Antilles. The British, outnumbered and outmaneuvered, had temporarily lost control of the West Indian waters.18 The Spanish colonies in America were spared an immediate attack because French naval superiority in the West Indies was only one manifestation of British weakness in 1779. As Piers Mackesy stated:
The scanty British forces in West Florida had been ordered to seize New Orleans if war were declared, but had been unable to do so. For years both East and West Florida had lived in fear of an attack by the Spanish, since Spain's intention to retake the Floridas had never been concealed.20The fear was justified, for on August 27, the same day that Mayorga assumed power in Mexico City, Bernardo de Gálvez, Governor of Louisiana, led an army of 1,427 men against his first English objective, the fort at Manchac.21 There being no war emergency that demanded his immediate attention, Mayorga turned his attention to matters which had been neglected because of the death of his predecessor. He wrote numerous letters to José de Gálvez, most of them representative of the tedious but indispensable trivia that consumed the time of a Viceroy acting in his capacity of Captain General. The arrival of a cargo of solid shot for the fort at Perote was acknowledged.22 In obedience to a royal order of May 12th, Inspector General Pasqual de Cisneros had circulated a warning that royal officers of all ranks were forbidden to leave the realm unless directed to do so by an order from Spain.23 On May 30th a report on the progress of work on the earthquake-shaken fort at Acapulco had arrived. Mayorga forwarded it to Spain with a note of praise for the engineer in charge of the project, Engineer-Captain Ramon Panón.24 On August 29,
1779, while Mayorga was disposing of the unfinished business that
had accumulated during the regency of the Audiencia Gobierna, José
de Gálvez, dispatched from Spain a secret expediente
outlining the Objectives of Spain in the war and the part that New
Spain was expected to play in their attainment:
At the same that that he sent the above letter to Mexico, José de Gálvez issued several lesser orders concerned with New Spain's war effort. He approved the emergency remissions of money, powder, and food made by the Audiencia Gobierna; and he ordered that an additional 2,000 quintales of powder be sent to Havana, part for that port and part to be transshipped to Cartagena de Indias. The situado of Louisiana was to be raised from 155,322 pesos to 315,000 pesos because of the war, and Mayorga was to aid Bernardo de Gálvez in creating a company of dragoons if asked to do so.26 The expedientes cited were not received in Mexico City until February 1, 1780, after Governor Gálvez had taken Manchac, Baton Rouge, and Natchez and was on his way to Mobile. The five-months delay between the issuance of orders in Spain and their receipt in Mexico is only one example of the slow transmission of intelligence between the Peninsula and its American colonies. In peacetime such delays inhibited effective action both by the crown and by colonial authorities. In wartime, when communications were inevitably disrupted, the delays could be disastrous to planned military or naval actions. Spanish ministries issued directives in ignorance of the actual situation in the Indies. Colonial officers waited months for orders which they were often unable to execute because circumstances had made the orders meaningless by the time they arrived.27 In ignorance of the plans of José de Gálvez and in the absence of any known crisis in the Gulf theatre, Mayorga was free to deal with an emergency on the Pacific Coast. The Philippine Islands had to be notified of the declaration of war, and money had to be sent to Manila in the event that the regular sailings between New Spain and the islands were interrupted. When on August
13 the Audiencia Gobierna received the royal order declaring war on
Great Britain, it sent 200,000 pesos to the port of San Bias with
instructions that a vessel be sent to Manila as soon as possible carrying
150,000 pesos. The remaining 50,000 pesos were to be used to defray
the expenses of the voyage.30 In 1779 there had been regular
maritime traffic between New Spain and the Philippines for 214 years,
and in the light of this long practice of transpacific navigation,
it might be assumed that an order to dispatch a ship to Manila could
be easily and promptly executed. It proved impossible to comply with
the directive of the Audiencia without protracted delay. On the west
coast of New Spain there were few ships available for the royal service
and even fewer pilots trained in Pacific sailing. There was even a
shortage of the basic tools of navigation. Meanwhile, Mayorga instituted a vain search for pilots in the capital.31 The Administrador General of the Real Hacienda, Pedro Antonio de Cosio, urged that the Viceroy order whatever pilots might be in Veracruz to leave their ships and go to San Blas, whether the pilots were willing to go or not. Mayorga refused, however, to take this coercive step. It would be dangerous, he wrote to José de Gálvez, to entrust ships, money, and important papers to pilots who had to be forced to make the voyage and who were, moreover, ignorant of the Pacific Ocean. Two pilots were eventually found, but two more were needed,for the Viceroy had decided to send a second ship to Manila with an additional 150,000 pesos and copies of all important documents in case the first ship should fail to arrive. Antonio de Cosío found a five-volume maritime atlas, while Mayorga located some charts of the Pacific Ocean, two binnacle compasses, two surveyor's compasses, and two half-hour watch glasses. The pilots, glasses, and charts were hastily ordered to San Blas, and the Viceroy hopefully reported to Spain that if more pilots had been located, the "ships already could be sailing.32 But the last of the indispensable four pilots was not found until the end of September, when one was discovered commanding a schooner in the port of Guaymas. On October 10, the San Carlos sailed for Manila.33 At last, on December 18, 1779, the second paquebot, El Princípe, departed. The Governor of Manila was instructed to use the vessels indefinitely if he needed them. Mayorga requested him to return them to New Spain armed with full complements of artillery, because Manila had a cannon foundry, and New Spain had none. The ships had sailed from San Blas only partially armed, because few guns had been available by the time of sailing.34Almost six months elapsed between the day the Audiencia Gobierna issued the first order and the day the second vessel left San Blas. During the period
between the outbreak of war and the beginning of heavy shipments of
supplies to Havana, Mayorga set in motion a project which increased
the supply of gunpowder. Explosives had been manufactured in Mexico
since the time of Cortes, and by 1600 a factory had been constructed
at Chapultepec.and leased to private operators. The production and
sale of gunpowder was a crown monopoly, although it was neither centralized
nor closely supervised, and by the time of the visitation of José
de Gálvez, explosives were being made in 112 other places.In
1767 Gálvez reorganized production, raising the standard of
quality and lowering the price. Despite the lower price, the new code
worked so well that the Real Hacienda Even in peacetime there were heavy demands upon Mexican powder production. The continuous construction of fortifications in Cuba consumed explosives in demolition, excavation and quarrying, while the Mexican mining industry regularly used large quantities.36 It was certain that wartime demands would strain the facilities of the Chapultepac factory, for New Spain was the sole source of supply for Cuba and other islands, as well as for all ships of the Real Armada in American waters. The Peninsula produced its own powder, and after the Seven Years' War attempts had been made to increase its output. In 1766 Arriaga had asked Viceroy de Croix to send samples of salitre (potassium nitrate) to Spain for testing, since the mother country lacked this essential ingredient of black powder.37He reminded the Viceroy that Mexican production must be increased, since New Spain had to provide explosives not only for its own mining industry but also for "Havana and other dependent ports.38As the years passed, the Ministry of the Indies continued to express concern about the ability of the Chapultepec factory to meet wartime emergencies.39 Just before the beginning of hostilities in 1779, José de Gálvez, in an admission of weakness rarely found in his correspondence with the viceroys of New Spain, wrote:
When Mayorga received this letter, he acted with speed. During the viceregency of his predecessor, Bucareli, plans had been drawn for a new factory and a site selected: a barranca which ran from Tacubaya to Santa Fe. But Bucareli, who had been a thrifty administrator, had decided to improve the existing plant, and the new plant had never been built. The Viceroy reviewed the plans, and after consultation with Engineer-Captain Miguel Costanzo decreed on August 25, 1779, that the new factory be built. He did not call a junta of the Real Hacienda to discuss the matter because, as he explained to José de Gálvez, "of the delay which that formality required." Construction was to begin at once, and no offices or living quarters would be built until the machinery was in place. A weekly progress report would be required.41 The Viceroy's next step was to appoint a commission headed by a French engineer, Salvador de Dampier,42 to procure and to refine potassium nitrate, in anticipation of an increased consumption of this basic raw materia1.43 By September 20th the buildings which were to house the machinery had been framed, steel and iron for machinery had been collected, and a forge had been built on the site. Eighty men were working on the project under the direction of Engineer-Captain Costanzo.44 On August 27, 1780, exactly one year after he had first written to José de Gálvez of his decision to construct the new establishment, Mayorga reported to Spain that the new mill was in operation and that the first gunpowder had been produced. Royal officials had made formal test firings of the product, and its strength far exceeded the minimum standards required for the army and navv.45 The summer of 1779 was the only period of relative peace which Mayorga was to enjoy during his tenure of office. Within the area dependent upon New Spain for money and supplies, no army was in action except that of Bernardo de Gálvez. At the outbreak of war between Spain and England both powers had feared and expected assaults on their respective American colonies by the other, but only the Governor of Louisiana had taken the offensive. Sir Henry Clinton, Commander of British forces in the North American colonies, had admitted his inability to aid West Florida. Communication with the Province was so infrequent that Clinton did not even feel justified in sending instructions to Brigadier John Campbell, commanding in Pensacola, and
Meanwhile in Jamaica young Horatio Nelson, commanding a battery at Port Royal, was studying French in the expectation of being captured, for Governor Dalling of Jamaica had written to Clinton that Count d'Estaing was at Hispaniola with a fleet and army, and that "his descent upon the island may be daily expected." The Governor had no hope of successful resistance.47 Spain's fears of prompt attacks upon her American possessions corresponded to British apprehensions. Repeated warnings had been sent to New Spain since 1776, urging constant vigilance against a surprise British attack before the formal declaration of war by either nation. There was reason for concern, for as early as 17781 the anticipated entry of Spain into the war had suggested to the British a change of strategy, a means of breaking off the struggle with their colonies in North America and seeking compensation by the conquest and retention of French and Spanish territory. Hugh Elliott, British Minister to Prussia, had advised William Eden, Undersecretary for the Northern Department, to press for abandonment of the war with the rebellious thirteen colonies:
Researchers have found similar suggestions among the memoranda of Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for the colonies. Once King George III became convinced that Spain would intervene, he favored withdrawing British forces from the north and turning them against the Spanish and French colonies.49 There
were two reasons why such a shift of military objectives was impossible.
It was by no means certain that Great Britain was capable of capturing
and retaining the island colonies of the Bourbon allies, much less of
penetrating the vast expanse of the Spanish Main. Secondly, their former
American colonies, if freed from all British pressure, would be quite
capable of taking and occupying Canada, an enterprise which they had
attempted before their formal declaration of independence. If Canada
should fall, Great Britain would lose her last hold on the North American
continent. Regardless of military logic, England, over-extended and
driven by political necessity, had to continue the fight in both the
northern and southern hemispheres.
In December 1779, when Clinton learned of the fall of the British posts on the Mississippi, he repeated that he was unable to send assistance to West Florida. He again asked Sir Peter Parker at Jamaica to send a frigate or two to Pensacola, "whereby we might be enabled to retain at least one hold in West Florida"; but he feared the loss of the whole Province, because
While Bernardo de Gálvez was attacking enemy posts contiguous to Louisiana, the Governor of Yucatán, Roberto Rivas de Betancourt, was organizing a similar expedition against the British logwood cutters in the Bay of Honduras.52 On July 27, the Audiencia Gobierna of Mexico had sent 200 quintales of power to Yucatan. After the news of the war had reached the capital, Yucatan received an additional 300 quintales of powder and 100,000 pesos, because Betancourt had complained that lack of money and powder was delaying offensive action on his part.53 Two ships carried the supplies from Veracruz to Campeche, and Betancourt sailed with five schooners and three hundred militiamen almost simultaneously with Bernardo de Gálvez' attack on the Mississippi. By September 22nd, Betancourt had taken and sacked three log-cutting settlements on and near St. George's Island and Cayo Cocina, on the coast of present-day British Honduras.54 At the same time that Governor Betancourt was moving against the English log cutters a situation was developing in Guatemala which was to cause the Viceroy more trouble than British invaders. In July 1779, Matías de Gálvez, elder brother of the Minister of the Indies and father of Bernardo, arrived in Guatemala with the titles of Captain-General and President of the Royal Audiencia. Upon his arrival he made a tour of inspection and began the organization and arming of militia comrpanies.55 On August 28th, Matías de Gálvez asked Moyorga for a million pesos for defense purposes, the first of a series of peremptory demands which were to cause much bitterness between the two men. Mayorga felt that the resources of New Spain were not at the time adequate to justify such a disbursement, and in a letter to José de Gálvez explained why this was so. The Viceroy acknowledged that Matías de Gálvez had come to Guatemala with a royal order empowering him to call upon New Spain for whatever he needed to prosecute the war, but the treasuries of the viceroyalty had other responsibilities besides that of maintaining the defenses of Guatemala:
Furthermore, the Viceroy speculated, ships might come to Veracruz any day with orders for him to send money to Spain. He had written to the Captain-General of Guatemala that it was impossible to send him one million pesos. He had dispatched 100,000 pesos to Guatemala by forced marches, but he had only been able to gather that sum by borrowing it from the Factor of the Renta de Tabacos in Oaxaca. More money would follow as soon as it was avail¬able. Actually, within four days he was somehow able to find the balance of the million pesos and sent it after the first shipment.57 As it happened, Guatemala needed help shortly after Mayorga sent the money. At dawn on November 20th, a messenger from Matias de Gglvez entered Mexico City with the news that the fort of Omoa on the coast of Honduras58 had fallen to the British on October 16th. The invaders, attacking with twelve ships and an undetermined number of men, had overwhelmed the garrison. The Viceroy at once sent a courier to Veracruz with instructions to dispatch any ship available to Havana to carry an account of the incident to the Governor and the Commander of the Havana squadron. At the moment Mayorga was unable to do more. There were at his disposal in the harbor of Veracruz only two lightly-armed brigantines which were incapable of challenging the twelve ships reported by Matías de Gálvez. He would, he assured José de Gálvez, continue to rush all possible aid to the Captain-General by land.59 The British had not planned the capture of Omoa. Three ships of the Jamaica squadron had been cruising in the Gulf of Honduras when they learned from fugitives of the Spanish descent upon the woodcutters of Belize. At the same time, the British learned that there were two laden merchantmen at anchor in the bay of Omoa. There were aboard the British ships only a dozen soldiers commanded by a Captain-Commandant, William Dalrymple, but 150 woodcutters joined his small force as volunteers. This body of men recaptured the logwood settlements and then passed on to Omoa, where they achieved a complete surprise and took 265 Spanish prisoners in a bloodless assault. The amount of booty was considerable, but its exact value could not be determined, for Dalrymple seized everything and divided it among his soldiers, depriving the seamen and the volunteers of their shares. General Dalling, the Governor of Jamaica, urged Dalrymple to blow up the fortifications of Omoa and to evacuate the place, for it was unhealthful. Dalrymple, however, garrisoned the fort and sailed away, leaving the men in the fort to await counter-attack from Matías de Gálvez while they were reduced by fever and disease.60 As Mayorga reported to Spain, the small garrison was unable to advance into the interior, and they seemed to have no plan of campaign (parece no saben donde ir). Again he wrote to Cuba to ask that the Havana squadron attack the fort, for the British warships had departed. Meanwhile, he would continue to aidMatías de Gálvez as he could.61 Havana sent no help to Captain-General Gálvez, but this proved to be unnecessary. When he moved against the fort of Omoa in November with a motley force of 500 Negroes, Indians, and drafted criminals62 and made preparations for a siege, the British spiked the guns of the fort and embarked in small boats during the night. They took refuge on Roatan, one of the Bay Islands 100 miles northeast of Omoa, and Mayorga sent repeated appeals to Havana to attack the island. It was ill-defended, and there the British had stored all the plunder seized at Omoa.63 However, Juan Bautista Bonet, the Commandant of the Havana squadron, did not attack, nor did he answer the Viceroy's letters. The expulsion of the British from Omoa ended the immediate threat to the Spanish Mainland, and on November 20th, Mexico City learned that Bernardo de Gálvez had taken the British posts on the Mississippi River.64 By the same post the Viceroy was directed to increase the situado of Louisiana, which had been fixed at 300,000 pesos on August 30, 1779, by 144,677 pesos, a sum which was its Governor's estimate of money needed to move against Mobile.65 Bernardo de Gálvez spent the remainder of the year preparing for this expedition and in argument with the Captain-General of Cuba, who believed that Pensacola, not Mobile, should be the next objective.66 On the west coast of New Spain and in the Pacific Ocean there had been no word of British activity. On November 21st the annual ship from Manila made port at Acapulco after a long and arduous voyage begun on May 31st. She had sighted no sail, and the entire trip had been without incident.67 The safe arrival of the Manila ship,whose cargo was valued at 477,758 pesos," was the last noteworthy event of 1779.68 The fortuitous coincidence of the death of Bucareli, the designation of Mayorga as Viceroy, and the outbreak of war had brought about an abrupt transition of power and an unprecedented burden of responsibility for the new Viceroy, who began to ask Spain for a replacement almost as soon as he had assumed power.69 British weakness
in 1779 made a direct threat to New Spain impossible, and it became
obvious within a few months that the role of the Viceroyalty was to
be the support of the armed forces of Spain and France at any cost to
its own economy. A recapitulation of the money and goods dispatched
to Louisiana, Havana, and other points by November 20, 1779, earned
Mayorga a letter of commendation from José de Gálvez.70
but the brief moment of good feeling between Madrid and Mexico City
was not to last. The demands of the ports dependent upon New Spain soon
led to bitter and protracted controversies whose origin will be traced
in the next chapter. Footnotes to Chapter II 1. His service in Guatemala was arduous. Shortly after his arrival, on July 23, 1773, a violent earthquake destroyed the capital of Guatemala and devastated a wide area. In his reports to Spain of this disaster and its consequences, he stated that he had a force of only forty-eight dragoons to police the stricken region. Pillage, disease, and famine followed, and Guatemala, not a rich province under the best of conditions, was slow to recover. Manuel García Purón, Mexico a sus Gobernantes (Mexico: Libreria de Manuel Porrua, 1964) , p. 125. 2. When an Audiencia sat as a council of state to deliberate matters of political administration, its sessions were known as Acuerdos, and its decisions as Autos Acordados. While functioning as an Acuerdo, the colonial Audiencia exercised powers somewhat analogous to those of the Council of Castile in Spain. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America, p. 124. 3. Herbert I. Priestley, José de Gálvez, Vistor-General of New Spain (1765-1771) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1916), p. 9. Bucareli's salary had been 40,000 pesos per year. Bob, Bucareli, p. 25. 4. Manue. Rivera Cambas, Los Gobernantes de Mexico, Galeria de bioqratia de retratos de los virreves, imperadores, presidentes y otros qobernantes que han tenido Mexico, 2 Vols. (Mexico: Imprents de J. M. Aguilar Ortiz, 1872–1873), Vol. 1, p. 438). 5. Ibid., p. 439. 6. The road between Veracruz and the capital, which passed through Puebla, had apparently not been improved since the viceregency of the Marquis de Croix,_ although it was the most important road in the kingdom. De Croix, in his Instrucción of 1771 to his successor, Bucareli, stated that he had found the road in very bad condition, and that he had levied a tax of one and one-half real on every beast of burden traveling the road. He predicted that after the road had been improved, all travelers would be happy to pay the tax. De Croix, instrucción, pp. 79-80, num. 62. Mayorga's colorful description of the hardships and dangers of his forced journey is found in Mayorga to José de Gálvez, August 27, 1779, AGNM, CV, Vol. 122, No. 6, fols. 1v-3. 7. José de Gálvez to Bucareli, May 18, 1779, AGNM, RC, Vol. 116, expediente 257, fols. 451-451v. 8. José de Gálvez to Bucareli, June 24, 1779, ibid., expediente 296, fols. 510-510v. 9. William L.
Schurz has written that when word of the war between Spain and England
reached San Blas, a pilot named Francisco Murelle carried the news
to Manila in a ship's yawl, a feat which Schurz cited as proof of
the ease of navigation from New Spain to the Philippines, as contrasted
to the difficult eastward voyage. The Manila Galleon (New
York: E. P. Dutton, 1939), p. 247. No mention of this extraordinary
voyage was found in the correspondence of Mayorga.. On the contrary,
the Viceroy found it difficult to send a ship to Manila with news
of the war and emergency aid, a problem which is described in this
chapter. 11. The figures of troop strength are called approximations because there seems to be no agreement as to the exact count of regular army and militia enrollment. The biographer of Bucareli states that "their strength on paper reflected little actuality." Bobb, Bucareli, p. 102. The author who has made the most detailed study of the armies of New Spain in this period arrives at a total slightly higher than that given by Bobb, but she also states that reports of the number of troops and militiamen given out by individual units cannot be added to produce the totals reported by Bucareli and Mayorga to the Minister of the Indies. María del Carmen Veldzquez, El Estado de Guerra en Nueva Espana, 1760-1808 (Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico, 1950), p. 125. There is agreement that the militia units were in deplorable shape and that it was fortunate that they were not tested in battle against an invader. McAlister, Fuero Militar, p. 55. 12. Jose Antonio Calderón Quijano, Fortificaciones en Nueva Espana (Sevilla: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1953), p. 148. 13. Bobb, Bucareli, p. 120. 14. Ibid., pp.
122-123. Bobb observed that a sense of inferiority ran through the
defense plans and that "one must almost conclude that the only
really effective defense for the Mexican viceroyalty would have been
for Spain to remain at peace with England." Ibid., p. 121. 16. Gervasio de Artiflano, La Arduitectura naval Española en madera (Madrid: published by author, 1920), p. 364. 17. Fernandez Duro, Armada, Vol. 7, p. 282. 18. Mackesy, The War for America, pp. 273-274. The passage cited also states, that French successes in the islands and the threat of Spanish intervention caused six battalions of British troops intended to reinforce Sir Henry Clinton in North America to be retained for garrison duty in the British West Indies, thus indirectly aiding the cause of American independence 19. Ibid., p.
266. 21. Caughey, Gálvez,
p. 153. The foremost historian of the British army has written that
all British posts in Florida and on the Mississippi River should have
been evacuated at once, "so burdensome were they from their unhealthiness
and their absolute dependence on supplies from without." West
Florida did not learn that war had been declared until September.
John W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army, 14 Vols.
(London: MacMillan and Company, 1899-1930), Vol. III, pp. 307-308. 23. Same to same, ibid., Vol. 122, No. 19, fols. 11v-12. 24. Same to same,
ibid., Vol. 122, No. 28, 26v-27v. 28. José de Gálvez to Mayorga, August 26, 1779, AGNM, .RC, Vol. 117, expediente 107, fol. 210; same to same, ibid., August 29, 1779, expediente 125, fol. 230; same to same, ibid., August 30, 1779, expediente 127, fol. 237. 27. The correo marítimo which had been established in 1764 and which departed La Coruña on the first of each month was apparently immediately disrupted by the war, if one can judge from the frequent and increasing complaints. about delayed mail delivery noted in Mayorga's correspondence. The armed forces of England in America operated under similar handicaps. A letter from London dated September 24, 1779, ordering three ships sent from New York to the Leeward Islands, did not reach its destination until May, 1780, and was not executed until a month later. Mackesy, The War for America, p. 332. 28. The port of San Blas was situated on the west coast of Mexico twelve leagues south of the Rio Santiago and seventy-five leagues from Guadalajara. There was a small inner harbor and a large outer anchorage. Inland there were forests of cedar and other -Ambers suitable for shipbuilding. The base had been created after José de Gálvez' Sonora expedition of 1767-1768 had shown the need for a permanent naval post in Nueva Galicia. The new Department of San Blas was independent; it derived its authority directly from the viceroy, indirectly from the crown, and it was considered a unit of the Real Armada. Shipbuilding had begun in 1767. The two paguebotes El Príncipe and San Carlos, which eventually went to Manila, were constructed in San Blas and were two-masted vessels of 139 tons burden, Michael E. Thurman, The Establishment of the Department of San Bias and its initial Naval Fleet, 1767-1770, The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. XLIII, No. 1 (February,1963), pp. 67-69, 71. 29. Among the papers to be sent to Manila was a letter from José de Gálvez to the Governor, José de Vasco y Vargas. Gálvez warned him that Manila must not be surprised again, as it had been in 1762. England's naval forces in Oriental waters were superior to those of France, and Gálvez regarded an attack on the Philippines entirely possible. He also emphasized that the annual galleon must not sail for Acapulco if the presence of British naval units was suspected. José de Gálvez to José Vasco de Vargas, May 18th, AGNM, RC, Vol. 116, expediente 256, reservada No. 133, fols. 449-450v. 30. Viceroy de Croix and Visitador José de Gálvez had begun planning a series of exploring voyages to the northwest in 1767. Exploration continued throughout the viceregency of Bucareli, but after the voyage of 1779, which was commanded by the famous pilot Juan Francisco Bodega y Cuadra, orders were received to discontinue exploration. Charles E. Chapmen, A History of Spanish California:the Spanish Period (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1921) , p. 343. 31. Mayorga to José de Gálvez, September 26, 1779, AGNM, CV, Vol. 123, No. 82, fols. 11-13. 32. Same to same, Ibid.. No. 81, fols. 7-11; fols. 7-11; No. 83, fol. 13v. 33. Same to same, November 15, 1779, ibid., No. 154, fols. 22-24. 34. Same to same, December 15, 1779, ibid., Vol. 125, No. 183, fols. 7-7v. 35. Priestley, José de Gálvez, pp. 346-347. Because of the wide distribution of saltpetre and sulphur beds in Mexico there were many illicit powder factories. Humboldt estimated that the royal factories produced only one-quarter of the explosives used in Mexico. Humboldt, Ensayo político sobre la Nueva España, sexta edicion castellana, 5 Vols. (Mexico: Editorial Pedro Robredo, 1941), Vol. 4, p. 17. 36. One mine, La Valenciana, in Guanajuato, used from 1,400 to 1,500 quintales annually. Ibid., p. 17. 37. Arriaga to de Croix, November 15, 1766, AGNM, RC, Vol. 89,.expediente 96, fols. 254-256. 38. Same to same, December 23, 1766, ibid., expediente 217, fols. 254-256. 39 E.g., Arriaga to Bucareli, December 20, 1772, AGNM, RC, Vol. 101, expediente 164, fol. 521; José de Gálvez to Bucareli, July 8, 1777, ibid., Vol. 111, expediente 135, fol. 215. These are not the only letters urging increased powder output, but the urgency of their tone must have impressed Mayorga, for he referred several times to the two expedientes cited as justification for the expenSes of building a new plant. 40. José de Gálvez to Bucareli, May 15, 1779, AGNM, RC, Vol. 116, expediente 243, fol. 424. 41. Mayorga to José de Gálvez, August 27, 1779, AGNM, CV, Vol. 122, No. 11, fols. 5-6v. Scattered throughout Mayorga's correspondence are many references to correspondence of previous years, and it is evident that the Viceroy had thoroughly perused the letters sent and received by his immediate predecessors. It may be that his decision not to convene a junta to discuss the new powder factory was prompted by advice once given to Viceroy Cruillas by the old Minister of the Indies, Julian de Arriaga. On November 14, 1761, when war with England appeared imminent, the veteran administrator counseled Cruillas:
41. Arriaga to
Cruillas, November 14, 1761, AGNM, RC, Vol. 81, expediente
166, no pagination. 43. Mayorga to José de Gálvez, September 26, 1779, AGNM, CV, Vol. 123, No. 85, fol. 35. 44. Same to same, September 29, 1779, ibid., No. 124, fols. 59-60. 45. An instrucción issued August 1777, which was used as a standard of excellence, required that a half-ounce of powder propel a musket-ball 240 feet to be acceptable for the royal service. Six test shots from each of several lots of powder were fired at the new plant; the range of the shots was from 318 feet to 398 feet. Same to same, August 27, 1779, ibid., Vol. 127, No. 619, fols. 14-15. The Spanish treatment of gunpowder as a crown monopoly provides an interesting contrast to Great Britain's method of supply. Before and during the American Revolution, gunpowder used by the British armed forces was brought from private manufacturers and merchants. In 1779 its poor and irregular quality provoked a strong protest from Admiral Samuel Barrington, then in command of the Leeward Islands station. In 1787 the British government began to manufacture its own powder. Fortescue, History of the British Army, Vol. 3, p. 547. 46. Quoted in
William B. Willcox, The American Rebellion: Sir Henry Clinton's
Narrative of His Campaign, 1775–1782 (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1954), p. 133([hereafter referred to as Willcox, American
Rebellion). 49. The King also suggested that New. Orleans be seized, whether Spain entered the war or not. Mackesy, The War for America, p. 185. 50. Willcox, The American Rebellion, p. 107. 51 Ibid., p. 154. Bernardo de Gálvez had devoted much effort to winning over the Indian. One hundred sixty had joined his march against the British posts on the Mississippi River, and the Governor was even able to persuade them to refrain from their usual practice of killing or mutilating their prisoners. Caughey, Gálvez, p. 163. Throughout his West Florida campaign Gálvez awarded large silver medals to the chiefs whose adherence he sought. A quantity of these medals had been struck at the Casa de Moneda in Mexico City and delivered to Louisiana. Gálvez to Mayorga, January 20, 1780, AGNM, RC, Vol. 118, expediente 49, fol. 66. 52. Scattered
settlements of Englishmen had been cutting logwood, or campeachy wood,
along the shores of the Gulf of Honduras since the seventeenth century.
Although Spain had frequently attacked the centers of cutting and
had protested against their presence through diplomatic channels,
the Baymen simply fled to the south when danger threatened and returned
when it had passed. Most of the establishments were in the neighborhood
of Belize, but there were more at Rio Negro, in present day Honduras.
Carlos III had determined to expel the intruders altogether, although
by the Treaty of Paris in 1763 Spain had agreed to tolerate the cutters
indefinitely on condition that their settlements would not be fortified. 53. Mayorga to José de Gálvez, September 26, 1779, AGNM, CV, Vol. 123, No. 84, fols. 13-15. 54. Same to same, November 20, 1779, ibid., Vol. 124, No. 167, fols. 39-40. St. George's Island is opposite the mouth of the Belize River, and Cayo Cocina is eight miles north of the river. 55.Agustin Menos Franco, Estudios históricos sobre Centro-America: duerras contra los ingleses Y administración de don Matias de Gálvez (Guatemala: La Academia Guatemalteca de la Lengua, 1959), p. 17 (hereafter referred to as Menos Franco, Estudios históricos). 56. Mayorga to
José de Gálvez, September 26, 1779, AGNM, CV, Vol. 123,
No. 123, foil. 19v. 59. Mayorga to José de Gálvez, November 20, 1779, AGNM, CV, Vol. 124, No. 169, fols. 40-41v. 60. Dalrymple was a very young officer who had no previous service in the tropics, and only Dalling's opposition prevented him from attempting to advance from Omoa across Guatemala toward the Pacific Ocean. Fortescue, History of the British Army, Vol. 3, p. 308; Mackasy, The War for America, p. 275. 61. Mayorga to José de Gálvez, November 27, 1779, AGNM, CV, Vol. 124, No. 172, fols. 46-48v. 62. Fernández Duro, Armada, Vol. 7, p. 283. 63. Mayorga to José de Gálvez, December 27, 1779, AGNM, CV, Vol. 125, No. 200, fols. 20-21v. Although a report to the British Colonial Office disarmingly reported Matías de Gálvez' army to be a "party-colored rabble," it was more than adequate for the recapture of Omoa. Only seventy-four men of the garrison, mostly Negroes, were physically fit for duty when Gálvez appeared Mackesy, The War for America, p. 335. 64. Mayorga to José de Gálvez, November 20, 1779, AGNM, CV, Vol. 124, No. 163, fols. 36v-37. 65.Same to same, ibid., No. 164, fols. 37-37v. 66. Caughey, Gálvez, pp. 173-174. 67. Mayorga to José de Gálvez, November 25, 1779, AGNM, CV, Vol. 124, No. 171, fols. 45v-46v. The Commandant of the ship, José de Amparen, complained that the length of this voyage was due in part to his having to call at Monterey, California, in obedience to a royal order issued in 1773. Although a Commandant could be fined 4,000 pesos for not calling at Monterey, most preferred to risk the fine rather than to suffer the delay. Schurz, Manila Galleon, pp. 245-246. 68. Mayorga to José de Gálvez, December 27, 1779, AGNM, CV, Vol. 125, No. 191, fol. 15v. Schurz has written that it is difficult to determine accurately the value of the goods shipped from Manila to Mexico. The merchants of the islands wished the Spanish merchants to remain in ignorance of the true value of Philippine commerce, and the cargo manifests were frequently falsified. Schurz, Manila Galleon, p. 45. 69. Rivera Cambas,
Los Gobernantes de Mexico, Vol. 1, p. 440.
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