THE FINANCIAL
STRAIN OF WAR In the year 1782, the correspondence between Spain and Mexico City concerning the progress of the war began on a familiar note: the supplies sent to Havana were insufficient for its needs. The complaints of the Minister of the Indies were based on information which he had received from Cuba the previous July, so slow was the transmission of letters across the Atlantic in wartime. The officials of Havana had reported that the needs of the armed forces were so desperate that all shipments of food and money from Veracruz were consumed or spent immediately upon their arrival, and that all the warehouses were empty. All treasuries were exhausted, and all branches of the royal service had incurred extraordinary debts. José de Gálvez wrote that this deplorable situation had been called to the attention of the king, who had ordered that New Spain redouble its efforts regardless of the means used. The Viceroy's failure to increase the support given Havana would prevent Bernardo de Gálvez from the accomplishment of the great objective with which he had been entrusted: the invasion of Jamaica.1 Since this rebuke was not received in Mexico City until July 6th, it must have crossed in its passage a letter from the Viceroy in which Mayorga made it clear that the financial resources of New Spain had at last been exhausted, at least for the time being. On January 12, 1782, the warship San Francisco de Asis had sailed from Veracruz for Havana with two million pesos, and Mayorga had been notified that another ship from Havana would arrive in February for more money, and that it would convoy a number of merchantmen which would transport food. Although the advice from Havana had not stated how many food ships would arrive, their number did not matter. There were enough provisions in the warehouses of Veracruz to fill all the vessels which Havana was likely to send at one time. Regardless of the number of ships that came for money and food, the utility of their cargoes would be greatly lessened unless they sailed promptly for Havana after loading. Their turn-around time was inexcusably long, Mayorga stated, and it was not the merchant ships that caused the delays. Their armed escorts the warships of the Real Armada, were seldom ready for sea when the store ships were prepared to sail. Although he had been notified to expect a warship and its convoy of merchantmen in February, at the date of writing, March 6, they had not made port, nor had any officer in Veracruz had word of them. No matter how he exerted himself to accumulate money and food at Veracruz, Havana could not fully benefit from his diligence unless the supplies moved promptly. Therefore, the Viceroy stated, he had on that date sent orders to the officials of the Real Hacienda in Veracruz not to allow any warship from Havana to remain in the port longer than eight days. As for the money which the tardy warships would carry to Havana, there were waiting in Veracruz 4,000,000 pesos. One million of this sum was a payment due the House of Cabarrus, and the remainder was for the needs of military and naval installations of Havana. Mayorga expressed the hope that a portion of this money would be given to the Viceroy at Santa Fe de Bogota, who had written both to him and to the Intendant at Havana to ask for 500,000 pesos. By the time Mayorga received the request from Santa Fe, the San Francisco de Asis had been ready to sail. All that he could collect on short notice was 200,000 pesos. but he had rushed them to Veracruz. The custodians of this emergency shipment had found the warship in the act of making sail, and although they had asked the master to receive the money, he had refused, alleging that his ship was already behind schedule. It was Mayorga's belief that at the moment the needs of the Viceroyalty of New Granada were greater than those of Havana.2 He had written to the Cuban officials urging them to aid Santa Fé de Bogotá, but neither Cuba nor New Granada could be helped until the overdue warship arrived at Veracruz to load the four million pesos. By this shipment of money, the Viceroy affirmed,
In ignorance of the exhaustion of New Spain's treasuries, José de Gálvez imposed yet another obligation on the Viceroy. At some time in the near future a representative of Colonel Gilberto Antonio de Maxent, the lieutenant of Bernardo de Gálvez in West Florida, would present himself in Mexico City with written authorization from Martín de Navarro, the Intendant of Louisiana. Upon presentation of this order the Viceroy was to pay 300,000 pesos to the bearer for an unspecified purpose. The directive to make this extraordinary disbursement was concluded with the warning which had become routine in José de Gálvez' to Mayorga:
The shortage of shipping in the Gulf of Mexico, which had hampered the movement of supplies from Veracruz to Havana since the outbreak of war, was beyond the power of the Viceroy to solve without the cooperation of the officials in Cuba. There was on the east coast of New Spain no shipyard capable of building ocean-going vessels. A shipyard had once been in operation at the mouth of the Coatzacoalcos River on the coast south of Veracruz, but construction had proved too costly, and the yard had been abandoned in 1734. During the viceregency of Bucareli the crown had proposed to reestablish the yard, but no action had been taken.5 The Pacific coast of New Spain also lacked ships for the royal service, and in this area Havana could be of no assistance. On this coast the Viceroy had the responsibility of supplying the missions and pueblos of California, as well as sending aid to Captain General Matías de Gálvez in Guatemala. Although the lack of serviceable royal ships had forced Mayorga to charter a Peruvian merchantman in 1780,6 several ships had been constructed at the port of San Blas on the coast of Nueva Galicia since 1767. In the summer of 1781 before the demands of Havana drained the treasuries, the Viceroy proposed to Spain that a frigate be built there; and he proposed also that an ample supply of tools and naval stores be kept in the warehouses of San Blas for future emergencies. After consultation with the San Blas officials he made a list of the equipment needed for the construction of the new ship and for a stockpile of replacement gear. On March 20, 1782, after an eight-month interval, José de Gálvez forbade the construction of the ship at San Blas. Instead, he had ordered that it be built at Cavite, in the Philippines, where he had forwarded the specifications drawn up by the San Bias officials. Construction costs would be lower in the islands, and the excellent woods available locally would be more durable than those of San Blas.7 The Minister of the Indies realized the necessity of maintaining extra stores at San Bias. Therefore he had sent orders to Cádiz to ship the supplies specified in Mayorga's list by the next registro bound for Veracruz. However, because such stores were in short supply, "there will be sent one-half of the equipment listed in your letter.8 There the matter apparently ended. There are no references in the correspondence of Mayorga to the delivery of naval stores from Cádiz to Veracruz nor of the delivery of a new, island-built ship from Cavite to the Pacific coast of New Spain The efforts of the Viceroy to expedite maritime traffic on the Pacific and Atlantic coasts were thwarted by the order canceling his plans to build a much-needed ship at San Bias and by disregard for his orders to limit the time spent at Veracruz by a Havana ship to eight days. On March 6 the warship which Havana had promised in February arrived. Its Commandant was informed that he was to sail within eight days and that there was no excuse for delay; the treasure was ready for shipment. The port officials of Veracruz had been given strict orders to speed the departure of the ship and to assist its loading in any way possible. On March 26 Mayorga received word that the warship and the 4,000,000 pesos were still in Veracruz and that it would not leave until April 1, carrying the money and whatever food it could take. The Viceroy had believed that it had gone long before. Not only had his orders been ignored, Mayorga complained to José de Gálvez, but the fact that no storeships had accompanied the treasure ship meant that the warehouses of Verzcruz would remain full of food which was slowly rotting in the heat. The problem seemed to have no solution. If he ceased delivery of food to the port, there would be none ready if ships came for it. Yet if ships from Havana did not come more frequently and in greater numbers, the stored food would be wasted. Mayorga apparently believed that the Minister of the Indies was representing his actions to the king in the worst possible light, for he concluded the account of his difficulties with Havana by this admonition:
The primary concern of both José de Gálvez and Mayorga during the first three months of 1782 was the outfitting and provisioning of the fleet and army gathering to attack Jamaica, an operation which had been scheduled for March. In spite of the repeated warnings from the Minister of the Indies to Mayorga and to other American officials that the preparations for the invasion be kept secret, both London and the British West Indies had been aware of the threat to the island as early as October, 1781. Although the ministry of Lord North had been shaken by the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown and would in fact fall in March, 1782, the decision was taken to make an all-out effort to defeat the enemy in the West Indies. It was known that reinforcements for the forces threatening Jamaica were being readied in Cádiz and Brest. The only hope of salvaging anything from the war in America lay in mustering all the warship which could be fitted out in England and outdistancing the French and Spanish reinforcements across the Atlantic. The task was entrusted to Admiral Gorge Rodney, whose unwise absence from his West Indian command in the summer of 1781 had facilitated de Grasse's skilful move to Chesapeake Bay to entrap Cornwallis.10 Rodney was equal to the task, for in spite of supply shortages, dockyard inefficiency and violent weather he sailed for the West Indies on January 14, 1782 with fifteen ships of the line and a promise of more to follow as they were fitted out, The French ships at Brest, without whose reinforcement de Grasse would not attack Jamaica, were kept in port by the same westerly gale which Rodney was able to weather. Rodney's daring meant the difference between defeat and victory. On February 25 he joined Admiral Samuel Hood's twelve ships of the line at St. Lucia. For the first time since 1779 superiority at sea had passed to the English. On the island of Jamaica preparations for defense were underway. Governor Dalling, who had ordered the costly and futile expedition against Nicaragua: had been cordially hated by every sector of the island population. He had surrendered his post and returned to England, leaving the government in the hands of the Lieutenant-Governor, Brigadier General Archibald Campbell. This competent and well-liked officer reorganized the militia, strengthened the fortifications and sent out small craft to gather intelligence of the enemy's moves.11 Two days after Rodney's arrival in the West Indies he received a letter from Campbell giving full details of the enemy's preparations. A Jamaica ship had just captured a Spanish schooner bound from Cap François to Santiago de Cuba. On board the captured ship there were some English seamen who had been taken prisoner some time before. By interrogation of both the Spaniards and the Englishmen the Jamaica authorities had been able to piece together an accurate account of enemy strength and intentions. Campbell informed Rodney that "Don Gálvez" (Bernardo de Gálvez) had just arrived at Cap François with eight warships and 5,000 troops from Cuba. "Don Solano" (Josef Solano, Commandant of Marine) was underway from Havana to Cap François with more ships and men. Cuban militia were assembling at Santiago de Cuba to be trans¬ported to Jamaica. The Spaniards were collecting provisions at Santiago de Cuba for the expeditionary force. Most important of all, the invasion would not begin until reinforcements of ships and men arrived from Cadiz and Brest.12 More ships continued to join Rodney's fleet from North America and England. Even after four ships of the line from Brest joined de Grasse at Martinique, the British outnumbered their foes thirty-six ships to thirty-three. At St. Lucia Rodney waited for de Grasse to move toward a junction with the Spanish at Santo Domingo. On April 7, 1782, word came from English picket ships that the French had left Martinique and had steered northward. Battle was joined near the Iles des Saintes and by April 11 the French had been defeated and de Grasse was Rodney's prisoner. Some units of the French fleet escaped to Santo Domingo,
Apparently the Minister of the Indies never sent the Viceroy of New Spain a formal admission that plans to invade Jamaica had been abandoned after the defeat of de Grasse's fleet. Nor does a reading of Mayorga's correspondence reveal comment on the Battle of the Saints. Reference to an expedition against the island simply ceased after April, 1782, as if by a tacit acknowledgement of its impossibility. Bernardo de Gálvez had become impatient of the delays in attacking Jamaica long before the French defeat made it impracticable, and had turned his attention temporarily to a lesser offensive move against the English. In February, 1781, the Minister of the Indies had directed that "when the circumstances permit, an expedition should be formed against the Island of Providence.14 British Privateers based on Nassau on the island of New Providence in the Bahamas had by the beginning of 1782 captured fourteen Spanish, twenty-four French, one Dutch, and 137 American vessels. From January to April 1782, Bernardo struggled with the naval authorities of Havana to obtain warships to convoy troop transports to New Providence. General Juan Manuel Cajigal, who had been entrusted with the command of the expedition, finally accepted the aid of an American privateer to guard his flotilla on the way to the Bahamas.15 Cajigal's force sailed from Havana on April 22 and reached Nassau on May 6. When called upon to surrender, Governor Maxwell complied at once. In view of the condition of the garrison under his command, his decision not to contest the Spanish invasion was unavoidable.16 The 274 English regulars and 338 militiamen taken prisoner were freed on parole and permitted to go to any English possession except Jamaica. One hundred and fifty-five pieces of artillery were captured, but the most important gain was the seizure of twelve privateers and sixty-five merchant vessels which had been trapped in port when Cajigal's force arrived.17 While the operation against New Providence was being planned and executed with little difficulty, Matías de Gálvez began an attack upon the English settlements in the Bay of Honduras. With more than 1,000 men he invaded the English-held island of Roatan on March 16 and after a short but fierce battle forced the two forts on the island to capitulate. Within a few days he passed on to the mainland with his amphibious force and began systematically to take and put to the torch all the establishments occupied by the logwood cutters.18 In contrast to the bloodless conquest of Nassau, the battles for the Bay settlements were marked by acts of savagery committed by both the Spaniards and their enemies. The king had several times ordered that the Mosquito Indians and their allies be exterminated if possible. The Indians, zambos and fugitive slaves were well aware that they could expect little mercy if they were captured. Consequently, they gave no quarter to Spanish captives. Although Captain General Gálvez made a clean sweep of the coastal settlements, his temporary hold on the area could not be long maintained,.. because of the limited force at his disposal and the difficulties of supplying permanent garrisons. When hard-pressed, the Baymen and their allies fled into the forbidding interior or retreated to other points along the coast. How the Bay settlers were able to disperse, to obtain food and to regroup is shown by a letter from the Governor of Jamaica to Admiral Rodney written June 4, 1782:
Rodney did not respond to this letter; and on June 24 Campbell wrote again in more urgent terms, repeating that the Bay settlers must be given aid and that the Spaniards must be driven from their newly-won positions.20 The Admiral answered Campbell's second appeal thus:
The "blowing weather" which had crippled Rodney's ships had completely cut supply lines between Yucatán, Gálvez' base in Honduras, and the positions recently taken by his army. Communication between the ports was possible only by sea; protracted onshore winds and the chronic shortage of shipping meant disaster for the Spaniards. The small and isolated garrisons which the Captain General had left scattered along the Bay of Honduras were swiftly riddled by hunger and disease. In some cases the men were reduced to eating bananas exclusively.22 As soon as the gales abated, the English on Jamaica, freed by the Battle of the Saints of the French menace which for months had restricted their naval operations, struck again at the Bay settlements. On August 17, an expedition arrived at Cape Gracias a Dios to unite with the Baymen who had taken refuge at this most easterly point of Nicaragua. In the next two weeks the English recovered all the posts which Matías de Gálvez had taken. By August 31 the invaders had reached the mouth of the Rio Negro, where the Spanish garrison surrendered the settlement of Criva. In reporting this latest reverse to Spain Viceroy Mayorga asserted that the officer commanding at Criva had no alternative to capitulation, for the English had come in overwhelming force: two ships of the line, six frigates, two brigantines and a galley. The English crewmen of the squadron were aided by 1,000 Indians and Zambos and 500 Negroes. Many of the Spanish garrison were disabled by illness, and there were neither munitions nor provisions.23 When Mayorga received notice of. the loss of Matías de Gálvez' recent conquests, he offered the Captain General whatever aid he needed to recover the lost territory. As it happened, no other attempt was made to retake the Bay settlements. No further offensive action was undertaken by any of the powers in the Gulf of Mexico or the Caribbean theatre from mid-summer, 1782, until the formal cessation of hostilities. In Europe the first tentative moves toward ending the war had begun. After Yorktown the Americas, France, and England were all anxious to begin preliminary talks. The North ministry had no sooner fallen in England than Benjamin Franklin, American Commissioner in Paris, hinted by a note to Lord Shelburne, Secretary for Home Affairs, that he would talk with an envoy from London. Richard Oswald, appointed as the agent of Shelburne, had his first meeting with Franklin on April 12, 1782. Franklin then introduced Oswald to Count Vergennes, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs.24 Count Floridablanca, the principal minister of Carlos III, felt that the time had come to define the claims of Spain to be presented in the near future. On May 24, 1782, he drew up an apuntamiento (abstract) to be presented to the Council of Castile, outlining the general terms which the government of Spain must bear in mind during the negotiations among the belligerent powers. Comparing a treaty to the settlement of a suit at law which had been pending for a long time without having been judged, he began by asserting that Spain found itself in a very strong position and that the nation should be able to gain all that it had sought when it declared war. In the Mexican Gulf all foreigners had been successfully expelled; Mobile, Pensacola and all the forts on the Mississippi River had been taken. Spain needed only to assure her claim in perpetuity to these settlements and their dependencies as far as the mouth of the Bahama Strait. In the Gulf and Bay of Honduras and on the coast of
the peninsula of Yucatán
the settlements, English for the most part, had been totally destroyed,
and according to the latest news, the coast would soon be taken in its
entirety. In Europe Spain still hoped for the acquisition of Gibraltar
and Minorca. Minorca had been taken by a joint French and Spanish expedition
in February, 1792, and a supreme effort would be made to seize Gibraltar
within four months. All preparations had been made for an overwhelming
assault on the fortress, and success could be expected. Floridablanca
called these objectives, with those in the Gulf of Mexico "los
puntos cardenales de is querra o de la paz" (the cardinal points
of war or peace). Or, alternatively, if Spain could seize Jamaica, a
"superabundante recompensa" (ample compensation) could be
arranged by which Spain would return Jamaica to England, retain Minorca,
and acquire Gibraltar bloodlessly. If the war went well, it might even
be possible At the time Count Floridablanca wrote this paper he had not learned of the decisive defeat of de Grasse's fleet the previous month, and the English counterattack in the Bay of Honduras was two months in the future. Rodney's victory at the Battle of the Saints restored English naval supremacy in American waters and made the invasion of Jamaica impossible for the time being. Spain attempted no more adventures in America in 1782, because its energies were directed toward another attack on Gibraltar. Count Floridablanca's prediction of another effort within four months was accurate, for on September 13 combined forces of Spain and France began their most ambitious attempt to overwhelm the British defenses. The attack was a total failure. It still might have been possible to starve Gibraltar into submission if the Spanish and French could have blocked the entry of supplies into the fortress, but a fortuitous combination of circumstances deprived the besiegers of this last weapon. The energy of twenty-three year old William Pitt, Chancellor of the Exchequer, who contended almost single-handedly with general war-weariness and inertia, was responsible for forming a relief expedition which sailed for Gibraltar two days after the Spanish and French began their great attack. The supply squadron arrived at a moment when the futile assault had been suspended and the blockading fleet which lay at Algeciras had been scattered by a violent gale. The English accomplished the final relief of Gibraltar without opposition.27 "Little remains but to relate how the American war ebbed away and Jamaica remained secure against the last efforts of the Bourbons." With this sentence a British historian disposes of all military and naval action from mid-1782 until the signing of the preliminary terms of peace in Paris on January 20, 1783.28 Yet the "ebbing away" of hostilities in America brought no corresponding diminution of the obligations of New Spain to support armed establishments of Spanish North America. Ships and fortifications had to be maintained; crews and garrisons had to be paid and fed. The same problems of supply which had persisted since 1779 continued without satisfactory solutions during the rest of the year 1782. José de Gálvez continued his familiar exhortations to speed cargoes to Cuba, and the Havana officials received yet another rebuke for sending unseaworthy vessels to Verzcruz.29 New Spain continued to support its dependencies, but only by a great effort. In July, 1782, the Viceroy made it clear to the Minister of the Indies that the income of the Real Hacienda no longer sufficed to meet the needs of the internal economy of New Spain and at the same time to satisfy the incessant demands of Havana. Yet, paradoxically, in spite of the unprecedented sums sent to Cuba the members of the armed forces and the island's civilian population were ill-fed. In response to the most recent complaint from José de Gálvez that the viceroyalty's support of Cuba had been "scant," Mayorga wrote a long expository letter in which he described the fiscal plight of his kingdom. He began by noting the recent departure from Veracruz of the warship San Francisco de Asis with 2,000,000 pesos destined for Havana. This shipment of cash raised the amount sent to Havana since January, 1782, to 9,000,000 pesos. In fact, money was being shipped to Cuba more frequently than provisions, because those who commanded at Havana sent too few food ships. The Viceroy had attempted to augment the flow of food to the island by commandeering ships that came from Campeche to Veracruz and dispatching them to Cuba, but this irregular source of transport could not be relied upon. The lack of shipping space had resulted in the spoilage of thousands of pounds of flour. The flour had been dumped into the sea, because it was unfit for consumption and could not be sold even at reduced prices. The Fiscal, Ramón de Posada, had told the Viceroy that the lack of food in Havana was due to the fact that all available merchant ships of that port had been commandeered by the officials of the Marine for employment in the royal service. The merchants of the island found themselves without means to carry provisions from Veracruz to satisfy the normal demands of their trade. Mayorga stated that he had sent copies of the Fiscal's allegation to Havana, and that he had asked those in command how they proposed to solve the difficulty. If ships belonging to or chartered by the Real Armada did not call at Veracruz for food, and if at the same time the merchants were denied use of cargo space, how was the island to be fed? At the time of writing, July 6, the Viceroy had received no response to his queries from Havana. In view of the distress of the Havana merchants and the needs of the civilian population, the Viceroy had taken an unprecedented step to relieve the scarcity of food. He had ordered that flour consigned to private merchants be embarked at Veracruz on warships bound for Havana. Mayorga hoped that the resort to this extraordinary expedient would make it clear to the Minister of the Indies that the food shortage in Cuba was not his fault. The Viceroy added, parenthetically, that he hoped José de Gálvez would present the situation in its true light to the king. The 9,000,000 pesos which had been sent to Havana had been accumulated by great effort, and it would have not been possible to send this amount if the Viceroy had not borrowed 1,500,000 from private individuals. The Viceroy had at last been forced to ask loans from the Consulado de Comercio and the Real Cuerpo de Minerla.30 Each of these bodies had offered to lend the crown 1,000,000 pesos, and each had demanded special privileges for doing so. The Consulado de Comercio received for its maintenance six-tenths of one percent of the value of all merchandise imported from Europe. This maintenance tax (derecho de averia para su subsistencia) was to be increased to a flat one percent until the Crown repaid its debt to the Consulado. The Real Cuerpo de Mineria was to be permitted to collect from the Casa de Moneda twenty grains for each ounce of twenty-two carat gold and ten grains for each silver mark that the mint received.31 The movement of private and crown cargoes, between New Spain and Havana and between Havana and Spain, continued to be irregular and infrequent. On May 5, 1782, a fleet of mercury ships from Spain made port at Veracruz, and the Viceroy took advantage of their presence to embark goods of private merchants for shipment to Cádiz. José de Gálvez, mindful of the disruption of commerce caused by the war, instructed Mayorga to make preparations for the departure of a convoy from Veracruz in November. The Viceroy was to "hint, exhort and demand" (intime, exhoitey estreche) that all merchants collect as much money as possible for the purchase of Peninsular merchandise. These funds, together with all products destined for Spain, were to be sent to Veracruz before November 30, 1782. José de Gálvez had ordered the Commandant of Marine at Havana to send warships to Veracruz by the end of November to escort "whatever reqistros might be in condition to sail." The merchant ships and their escorts were to proceed to Havana by January, 1783. There they would be joined by the merchant ships in that port that were "fit to make it" (en aptitud de harcerlo). The combined ships were to sail for Spain in February. For the merchants of New Spain who were unable to meet the November 30 deadline for shipment another convoy might be arranged at a later date, "if the circumstances of the war should permit it.32 Although the war had all but halted the flow of traffic between New Spain and Cuba, the officials of Havana were unfailingly prompt in the delivery of requests for assistance needed by the military and naval establishments. Another such request reached Mexico City on August 28. It was beyond the capacity of New Spain to produce what Havana asked. The Viceroy, in explanation of his inability to comply, wrote for the Minister of the Indies a kind of abstract which listed the contributions of the viceroyalty to that date and reviewed the many obligations of its treasuries. The Governor of Havana had begun his statement of needs by asking for two battalions of troops for garrison duty in Cuba. The soldiers from New Spain would serve as replacements in units whose ranks were thinned by sickness. The Viceroy referred to the request to his Inspector General, Pascual de Cisneros. The Inspector responded, with many plausible arguments, that the transfer of any troops from New Spain was inadvisable.33 Josef Solano, Commandant of Marine at Havana, had asked for more seamen, but the Viceroy maintained that there were hardly enough sailors at Veracruz and other ports to serve the necessary coastal traffic. Between August, 1779, and July, 1782, 2,003 criminals and vagabonds had been condemned by the courts of New Spain to serve in the Havana squadron, and more would be pressed into service as soon as enough able-bodied man could be collected to warrant sending a ship from Havana to transport them. Mayorga had informed Francisco de Saavedra that it was impossible to send more troops and seamen to Havana, and Saavedra had understood.34 In the view of the Viceroy the demand of Havana exceeded reason, and he made a brief recapitulation of the money already disbursed to that port in order to prove that its officials were incapable of anticipating their own needs. In December, 1781, a French frigate had been pressed into service to make an emergency remission of 1,000,000 pesos to Havana because the Spanish warships sent to Veracruz for that purpose had been incapable of making sail. When the warship, the San Francisco de Asis, had finally been made seaworthy, it had carried more than 2,000,000 pesos. Then had come the warship San Agustín to carry back 4,000,000 pesos to Havana. The San Francisco de Asis soon returned, and on its second voyage it loaded 2,000,000 pesos for the same port. At the time that Mayorga wrote, September 25, 1782, the warship Velasco was at Veracruz, and 3,000,000 pesos had already been consigned to it. More than 12,000,000 pesos had been sent to Havana in nine months of the current year, 1782, and that sum was in excess of Havana's estimate for the entire year. Mayorga asserted that the crown income in New Spain had never equaled the sum collected in 1781: 18,916,390 pesos.35 Even so, the treasuries could not meet their heavy obligations. Already more than 4,000,000 pesos had been borrowed from private individuals, and the Consulados of Comercio and Minerla were in the process of raising another 2,000,000 pesos. Although José de Gálvez was well aware of the manifold nature of New Spain's financial commitments, the Viceroy listed them for emphasis: the funds sent to Spain, the situados of Havana, Louisiana, Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico, the Philippine Islands, the expenses of the Interior Provinces and the Department of San Blas, salaries, charities, special projects undertaken by order of the crown, remissions to Guatemala, and the salaries of the troops. On September 7 the treasury officials had given him a statement which proved that the total disbursements from the treasuries since the beginning of the war had reached 40,197,036 pesos. Even the unprecedented income could not support such burdens. Mayorga asked José de Gálvez to present these figures to the King, "who I do not doubt will understand that it has been impossible to make greater exertions.36 In enumerating the various purposes for which the wealth of New Spain was spent the Viceroy failed to mention that some items were subject to change without notice, a practice which made it impossible for treasury officials to predict disbursements for the coming year. Such a change was made less than one month after Mayorga had written his summary of New Spain's fiscal difficulties. On September 28 José de Gálvez ordered that the Province of Louisiana be paid 250,000 pesos to redeem an issue of paper money printed by its Intendant, Martin Navarro. No allegation was made that New Spain had been tardy in its payment of the situado; the shortage of money had resulted, it was said, from unspecified "extraordinary expenses.37 On October 26 another cedula followed directing that the situado of Louisiana 315,000 pesos, be doubled for the duration of the war. The 250,000 pesos for the redemption of Navarro's bills had still to be paid.38 Of more concern to the Viceroy than sudden demands for money, like the increased Louisiana situado, was the confusion resulting apparently from inaccurate bookkeeping in Mexico City or Havana. Two months after Mayorga had protested to José de Gálvez that the treasuries of New Spain could not support present obligations, his Fiscal informed him that it was impossible to reconcile Havana's account of money received from Mexico with the sums which the Mexican treasury officials claimed to have sent to Havana. On August 28, 1782, the Governor and the Commandant of Marine at Havana had presented a financial statement divided into two parts: an accounting of all funds received from New Spain during the past year, and an estimate of the money required for the coming year. According to its own records, Havana had received and had spent 13,889,726 pesos. It was alleged that this sum had been insufficient, and the warship Velasco had sailed from Veracruz with an emergency remission of 3,000,000 pesos, all that Mayorga could collect at the time (Havana had asked for 5,000,000 pesos). The puzzled Fiscal in Mexico City could not understand why Havana needed money for current expenses. The records in Mexico City showed that 13,946,550 pesos had been sent to the island, while Havana acknowledged paying out 13,889,726 pesos for all purposes. What had happened to the missing 56,824 pesos? Even if the discrepancy between money sent to Havana and money spent by Havana could be attributed to errors in bookkeeping, there remained serious inconsistencies between the records kept in Havana and those in Mexico City. Mayorga charged that Havana's reckoning would be incomplete even if the discovery of bookkeeping errors could make it arithmetically correct, for there were important items that did not appear in the recapitulation. Where, the Viceroy asked rhetorically, were the shipping charges which New Spain had to pay to merchant ships because ships of the Real Armada had not been sent from Havana when they had been needed? The expenses of Bernardo de Gálvez' army had not been listed. Mayorga could find no mention of the emergency shipment of 500,000 pesos in August, 1781, to give to de Grasse.39 After the financial statements from Havana arrived, the conciliar machinery of the government went into operation to determine how much money could be committed to the expenses of Havana and its dependencies for the coming year. The cajas reales of New Spain were empty, and the Tribunal de Cuentas was called into session to advise the Viceroy and the Fiscal.40 However, the Tribunal declared that it was unable to make an estimate of the crown income for the coming year; consequently the body had no course of action to recommend. The Viceroy and the Fiscal then decided to send all of New Spain's records of money paid to Havana to the Intendant of the Army at that port in the hope that the difference between the two accounts could be explained. Since the Tribunal de Cuentas had been unable to arrive at an approximation of the next year's income, Mayorga and the Fiscal called on a lower rank of the official hierarchy for aid. The Directors of all ramos of the Real Hacienda were asked to inventory the contents of their respective cajas and to calculate their next year's receipts. When each branch had made its inventory and attempted to fix the amount of its future collections, the Directors would form a Junta to apportion the burden of fulfilling Havana's demands, "which are made every moment" (sat a cada instanto se ofrezen). Mayorga declared that he was completely at a loss to determine exactly how much Havana needed for the coming year and when the "year" began. The estimate from which he was working had been prepared in Havana in August, but since then Havana had called several times not for specific sums but for all the Viceroy could deliver. Mayorga felt that Havana was already spending next year's subsidies. Therefore, he adjusted Havana's figures to fit his own interpretation. Havana had asked for 13,918,668 pesos, and that sum included 2,000,000 pesos which had to be paid in Havana as another installment of the Cabarrus loan. The warship Velasco was at the moment en route to Havana with 3,000,000 pesos, all that could be collected from the reales cajas and Mayorga felt that this sum should be deducted from Havana's estimate. Here the Viceroy's uncertainty is apparent in his phraseology: "At least to me it means the following" (a lo menos me siqnifica lo siquiente): that he needed to send 10,918,668 pesos to Havana during the coming year. From that date forward all remissions to Havana would be considered by a full junta of the Real Hacienda before being authorized and a full account of all the proceedings would be sent to Spain in quadriplicate.41 The question of the funds to maintain Havana and its dependencies was the last significant war matter to concern New Spain. No formal statement from Spain signaled the general reduction of activity. On the other hand, José de Gálvez outlined no more plans for future campaigns as he had done in past years. The war simply slowed to a stop, and as the year 1782 drew to a close, the flood of royal cedulas relative to military matters slowed to a trickle, and those few letters concerned only routine matters. In spite of the
Viceroy's protests that New Spain could not meet what Havana considered
to be its needs, money continued to flow from Mexico to Cuba. By December,
Mayorga had collected 2,000,000 pesos to send to Veracruz, where the
silver would await the next warship. A brief flurry of alarm occurred
when Havana reported that an English fleet had sailed from New York
for an unknown destination. The Viceroy ordered that all treasure bound
for Veracruz be stored at Jalapa, twenty leagues distant, until it should
be definitely known that the enemy naval force was not directed against
either New Spain or Cuba.42 As it happened, the British fleet
under Sir Samual Hood was moving to Jamaica in response to the repeated
requests of its Governor, who feared that the French and Spanish were
planning an invasion.43 There was a last flare-up of the old animosity between the Minister of the Indies and the Viceroy when José de Gálvez complained that the Governor of Yucatan did not have enough artillery or troops to protect his province against an enemy attack. Mayorga answered on December 14, 1782, with a curt letter notable for its uncharacteristic bluntness. The Viceroy declared that he had always aided Yucatàn promptly and effectively, that its Governor was well-pleased with the support he had receiver from Mexico and that he had letters from the Governor to prove it.44 It is possible that the Viceroy had learned from private sources of information that a cedula had been issued on October 14 relieving him of his position and designating Matías de Gálvez as his successor.45 The removal of Mayorga and his replacement by the Captain General of Guatemala may be interpreted as unofficial admission by the Spanish government that the war had for all practical purposes ended and that the talks then in progress in Paris would result in a definite peace treaty. The emergency which had caused Mayorga to be retained against his will as an interim viceroy had passed, and Matías de Gálvez gained the post from which,chance had barred him four years previously. Six months elapsed before the order by which Mayorga was relieved reached New Spain, and the Viceroy surrendered the baton of command to Gálvez on April 28, 178346 On May 19 the new Viceroy received official word from Madrid that Carlos III had acceded to the terms of the preliminary peace which had been signed in Paris on January 20, 1783.46 The war to which New Spain had contributed so much of its wealth had ended. The nature and extent of that aid will be examined in the conclusion which follows. Footnotes to Chapter V 1. José de Gálvez to Mayorga, January 21, 1782, AGNM, RC, Vol. 122, expediente 7, fol. 10. 2. In 1781 a revolt had occurred in New Granada which had required military aid from Cuba (see p. 215). 3. Mayorga to
José de Gálvez, March 6, 1782, AGNM, CV, Vol. 130, NO.
1542, fols. 167-168v. In spite of the exhausted treasuries the Viceroy
expressed confidence that New Spain would be able to meet an obligation
to pay 4,000,000 pesos to the House of Cabarrus before the end of
1782. Same to same, March 26, 1782, ibid., No. 1598, 4. José
de Gálvez to Mayorga, March 18, 1782, AGNM, RC Vol. 122,
expediente 72, fols. 132-132v. 6. See p. 118. 7. Ships were built in the yards of Cavite on Manila Bay by Chinese and Malayan workmen. The ships' frames were often made of teak, and the sheathing was usually of lananq, an island wood which had the peculiar quality of absorbing small shot yet causing large shot to rebound harmlessly. When the Manila-built galleon Santisima Trinidad was attacked by the British during the Seven Years' War, they scored 1,080 hits with solid shot on the hull of the great ship, but none of them penetrated the lananq sheathing. Schurz, The Manila Galleon, pp. 196-197. 8. José
de Gálvez to Mayorga, March 20, 1782, AGNM, RC, Vol. 122, expediente
74, fols. 136-136v. 10. "While the effects of his great miscalculation were unfolding in America he had been rewarded with the Vice-Admiralty of Great Britain." Mackesy, The War for America, pp. 444-445. 11. Ibid., p. 444. 12. General Campbell to Admiral Rodney, February 27, 1782, Rodney, Letter-Book, Vol. 1, p. 312. 13. Mackesy, The War for America, p. 348. 14. See pp. 179-180. 15. Caughey, Gálvez, pp. 244-245. 16. Since Nassau was a valuable base for privateers, it is difficult to understand why it had not been better garrisoned. Apparently Sir Henry Clinton had sent to the Bahamas only men who were incapable of serving anywhere else. The men sent to the islands were only serving time to make them eligible for disability benefits:
17. Ferngndez.Duro, Armada, Vol. 7, p. 291. The capture of New Providence alarmed the English in East Florida, who had lived in fear of a Spanish attack ever since the outbreak of war. St. Augustine was not well-garrisoned, but it was not attacked. Apparently East Florida owed its immunity to the unexpected length of Spanish operations in West Florida, the Natchez rebellion, plans for an attack on Jamaica, and the capture of New Providence. Mowat, East Florida, P. 123. 18. Fernandez
Duro, Armada, Vol. 7, pp. 291-292. 20.Same to same, June.24, 1782, ibid., pp. 461-462. 21. Rodney to
Campbell, June 26, 1782, ibid., pp. 454- 23. Mayorga to José de Gálvez, December 14, 1782, AGNM, CV, Vol. 131, No. 1897, fols. 255-256. 24. Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution, pp. 194-195. 25. Silas Deane, the first American agent sent to France by the Continental Congress, had drawn up, without authorization from Congress, a treaty with France and Spain which guaranteed their possessions in America, gave them access to the Newfoundland fisheries and excluded British ships from American waters. Ibid., p. 52. 26. Quoted in Danvila, Carlos III, Vol. 5, pp. 362-.363. 2.7. Mackesy, The War for America, pp. 483-484. 28. Ibid., p. 489. 29. José
de Gálvez to
Mayorga, April 26, 1782, AGNM, Vol. 122, expediente 122,
fols. 217-217v.
Quoted
in Bobb, Bucareli, p. 94.
34. The exact
identity of Francisco Saavedra and his mission to New Spain remain
a mystery. Mayorga speaks of him in his letter as having been "sent
by those Generals" (of Havana). Bancroft describes him as a mysterious
stranger who had no specific duties but who had access to the highest
official circles, Hubert H. Bancroft, The History of Mexico,
6 volumes (San Francisco: A. L. Bancroft Co., 1883-Iggr: Vol. 3, pp.
381-382. Bustamante, a partisan of Mayorga, has written, without citing
sources, that Saavedra was an agent of the Minister of the Indies
sent to criticize of censure (fiscalizar) the unfortunate Viceroy
who had unwittingly frustrated the designs of the Gálvez
family. Andres
Cavo, Los tres siqloe de Mexico durante el gobierno espanol baste
la entrada del e ercito tridarante con notes supplemento 221 el Licienciado
Carlos Maria de Bustamente, 4 vols. Mexico: Imprenta de Luis
Abadiano y Valdes, 1836–1838, Vol. 3, p. 42. 36. Mayorga to José de Gálvez, September 25, 1782, AGNM, CV, Vol. 131, no. 1824, fols. 155-157. 37. José de Gálvez to Mayorga, September 28, 1782, AGNM, RC, Vol. 123, expediente 119, fol. 269. 38. Same to same, October 26, 1782, ibid., expediente 153, fol. 333. This order to double the situado of Louisiana was not received until April 7, 1783, long after the preliminary peace treaty had been signed. 39. Mayorga knew how the 500,000 pesos had been spent. His letter cited the name of the French frigate which called at Havana for the money, the name of its commander and where the treasure ship made rendezvous with de Grasse's fleet. He mentioned de Grasse's successful operations in North America, and he was indignant because his government's timely contribution to the common war effort did not appear in Havana's account of money spent. 40. Until 1605 the Council of the Indies had been the final court of audit for all financial matters. In that year three tribunales de cuentas were established at Lima, Mexico City, and Sante Fé de Bogatá. These tribunals were independent of the audiencia, and they were empowered to audit all public accounts. Each year they inventoried the principal cajas reales. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America, pp. 282-283. The body had been described as a "tribunal which scrutinized the administration of the Hacienda and which was thoroughly informed on all fiscal questions." Lira Gonzalez, Aspecto fiscal de la Nueva Espana, p. 365. 41. Mayorga to José de Gálvez, November 28, 1782, AGNM, CV, Vol. X31, No. 1866, fols. 213-216. 42. Same to same, December 14, 1782, ibid., No. 1898, fols. 257-257v. 43. Mackesy, The War for America, p. 493. 44. Mayorga to José de Gálvez, December 14, 1782, AGNM, CV, Vol. 131, No. 1892, fols. 247-247v. 45. Matías de Gálvez must have been informed of his appointment as Viceroy before Mayorga received notice of it, for he began his journey northward from Guatemala on March 8. Rivera Cambas, Los sobernantes de México, Vol. 1, pp. 448-449. Mayorga had been requesting that the king name his successor ever since a courier from Mexico City had informed him on April 24, 1779, that the Audiencia Gobierna of Mexico City had named him Viceroy. He had declared that he was surprised by the honor and he had been reluctant to accept the post. On May 3, 1779, he wrote the first of many letters to Spain asking to be relieved, but a real cedula of August 27, 1779, had ordered him to continue serving as interim viceroy. After he had been in office only six months he wrote again to Spain to describe in detail the hardships he had to endure. After recapitulating his appeals for relief, he asserted that be would serve, as ordered, but he pleaded for full salary instead of the 20,000 pesos he received:
Mayorga to José
de Gálvez, February 28, 1780, AGNM, CV, Vol. 126, No. 377,
fols. 88-89. His salary was not increased.
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